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Abstract: This essay explores the contribution of two works of German literature to a decolonial
narrative ethics. It analyzes the structures of colonialism, taking narratives as a medium of and for
ethical reflection, and reinterprets the ethical concepts of recognition and responsibility. This essay
examines two stories. Franz Kafka’s Report to an Academy (1917) addresses the biological racism of
the German scientists around 1900, unmasking the racism that renders apes (or particular people)
the pre-life of human beings (or particular human beings). It also demonstrates that the politics
of recognition, based on conditional (mis-)recognition, must be replaced by an ethics of mutual
recognition. Uwe Timm’s Morenga (1978) uses the cross-reference of history and fiction as an aesthetic
principle, narrating the history of the German genocide of the Nama and Herero people at the
beginning of the 20th century. Intercultural understanding, the novel shows, is impossible when it is
based on the conditional, colonial (mis-)recognition that echoes Kafka’s unmasking; furthermore, the
novel illuminates the interrelation of recognition and responsibility that requires not only an aesthetic
ethics of reading based on attentiveness and response but also a political ethics that confronts the
(German) readers as historically situated agents who must take responsibility for their past.
Keywords: narrative ethics; recognition; responsibility; decoloniality; Kafka; Timm; racism; genocide;
German Empire

1. Introduction
Human beings, the “language animals”, as Charles Taylor argues alongside Aristotle and modern
Western hermeneutics, receive symbolic codes of meaning from the traditions they are born into as
much as they actively give meaning to their lives (Taylor 2016). By telling the stories of their tradition
in their own way and telling their own stories, they also change the codes and the narratives that
shape the traditions to which they belong. We end up in the infinite hermeneutic endeavor that we call
history: the interpretation of experiences and events over time in and through stories and histories.
Stories, narratives, and/or histories have been examined in view of what they represent, how they
represent it, in which medium and with what forms, and how they are received by readers.1 Because
narratives are the medium of giving meaning to experiences as well as the medium to explore the past
and the future using historical analyses as well as imagination, narrative theories intersect implicitly
or explicitly with other disciplines: history, philosophy, cultural theory, art theory, and aesthetics are
closest to narrative theory but it also intersects with ethical theories. Ethical theory addresses questions
of moral identity, character formation, moral conflicts, the actualization of social and/or moral values
and norms in concrete contexts, and institutions that establish the normative structures of actions;
narrative theory informs it how to analyze narratives in light of the scholarly works.

1

Several overviews and analyses are available that discern the different approaches to narrative theory in the 20th century.
For my interest, the more recent trends of the pragmatic turn in narrative theory over the last decades is most important,
especially feminist or postcolonial narrative theories. Cf. (Herman et al. 2012; Phelan and Rabinowitz 2008).
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In this essay, I will take up a specific task that complements that of critical postcolonial narrative
theory, as an effort of decolonizing patterns of thinking and acting. Ultimately, this is an ethical
endeavor, seeking to transform habits and structures of coloniality, but here, I want to show how
literature is a medium that may contribute to such a transformation by way of storytelling. In other
words, I want to inquire into the resistance of literature to the racism and depiction of racial superiority
that has dominated European modernity’s account of themselves. How has Western literature, and
works in German literature in particular, dealt with the colonial history? From a critical, pragmatic
rather than a narratological, structuralist, or poststructuralist perspective, power is the currency that
defines whose stories and what stories are being told, heard, read, and shared publicly. For instance,
what becomes part of a particular tradition is not merely limited by the finite perspective of any
of the narrators (historians and authors of fiction alike),2 but it is also a reflection of their position
within the social, political, and cultural reality from which they speak or write. Works of fiction often
play with social expectations and norms, revealing but also potentially disorienting unquestioned
power systems and/or epistemologies that are reflected in social orders, even though no storyteller
can entirely transcend their own position and perspective that is shaped by the multiple factors that
constitute their identity. Power is an intrinsic part of any story as well as extrinsic to it, because to
be completely transparent about the choices, selections, perspectives, or positions a storyteller may
take would undermine the narrative pact that readers make with narrators: reading means to follow a
story’s interest and partiality, albeit not uncritically.
Obviously, it is impossible in one essay to even attempt to grapple with the complexities of
narrative theory, aesthetics, and ethics; my contribution therefore takes up only one particular question
that is highly contested in current debates, namely the relationship of literature and historical events.
I will limit my inquiry to literary ethics rather than narrative ethics, because my interest concerns
the way literature may contribute to the knowledge, the self-understanding, and the critique of a
particular historical tradition. In this essay, I will address the colonial history of Germany. First, I will
analyze the habitus (Bourdieu 1990) of coloniality (Mignolo 2018) that guides the racial epistemology of
superiority and inferiority in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, and second, I will analyze
the elements of German colonialism over the course of the 19th and 20th century, as depicted in a novel
that also attends to the German genocide of the Nama and Herero at the beginning of the 20th century.
Overshadowed by the Shoah, it has only recently become the topic of public reckoning.
Literary narratives have sparked renewed interest over the last decades in trans- and
interdisciplinary studies, and narrative ethics has emerged as an umbrella term that is used in
literary narrative studies as well as in ethics, albeit with different meanings. On the one hand,
scholars of literature and/or narratology inquire about basic ethical concepts as they are constructed
in art (using the term “narrative” loosely), such as personal and moral identity, social values and
norms, agency and virtues, and the reflection of moral conflicts and moral imagination; they examine
narratives and factual or fictional literature—from everyday storytelling to narratives used in medical
deliberations or in novels, yet often without extended reception of ethical theory. Others have
reflected upon the pedagogical and public function of moral affects and emotions or the shifts and
changes of the modes of communication over time. Ethicists often use narratives as complements or
counterpoints to philosophical arguments, and they reflect especially upon unique personal experiential
reflections as corrective to the norms that orient judgments and actions. Narrative ethics has become an
important conversation partner for hermeneutics, too, and within ethical theory, I see it as part of the
hermeneutical ethics that complements normative judgments.3 With a new interest in phenomenology
and hermeneutics, the ethics of reading has become a part of reception aesthetics or, for example, is

2
3

For the relationship of history and fiction cf. (Ricœur 1988).
Cf. (Meretoja 2018), whom I follow in many ways, for a good overview of narrative ethics approaches. Her own approach
seeks to connect literary narrative studies with the hermeneutical and ethical endeavor to engage with one’s “being in the
world” through storytelling. Cf. also the works in ethical theory on a hermeneutical ethics in (Haker 2010; Wils 2001).
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further explored in a deconstructive literary theory that focuses on responsibility.4 In this essay that
explores the relationship of history and literature, I will use Ricœur’s concept of the “crossed reference”
of empirical and narrative truth. I will explore how fictional narratives may generate concepts central
not only for a decolonial narrative theory but also for a decolonial narrative ethics.5
In the first part, I will read Franz Kafka’s short story A Report to an Academy, written in 1917
(Kafka 1971), followed in the second part by a reading of Uwe Timm’s novel Morenga, from 1978 (Timm
2003).6 I will discuss how Kafka responds to the scientific theory of race at the beginning of the 20th
century, and analyze the elements of German colonialism that Timm illuminates in a complex narrative
that assembles documentary and fiction. The interweaving of history and fiction in narrative, which
Ricœur coined as crossed reference, serves as my guide in this essay. David Walter Price provides a
good summary of Ricœur’s hermeneutics and the way how literature is linked to the “real world of
action,” the area of ethical reflection:
Ricœur’s hermeneutic approach emerges, in part, from the philosophy of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, who acknowledges ‘the universal linguality of behavior relative to the world’
(Hermeneutics, p. 65). Ricœur stresses the narrative function of all historical explanations. In
doing so, he develops a three-part argument in opposition to positivist interpretations of
history. First, ‘there is more fiction in history’ than positivists care to admit. Second, narrative
fiction is more mimetic than positivists will allow. And third, there is the concept of ‘crossed
reference’ (reference croisée), by which Ricœur means that the references of fiction and history
“cross upon the basic historicity of human experience” (Hermeneutics, pp. 293–94). In other
words, Ricœur sees the two narrative modes of fiction and history as interweaving and
thereby bringing historicity to language. The tripartite argument leads Ricœur to conclude
that “the world of fiction leads us to the heart of the real world of action”. (Hermeneutics,
p. 296). (Price 1999, p. 24).7
2. Franz Kafka: A Report to an Academy
2.1. German Colonialism and Carl Hagenbeck’s Zoo
At the end of the 19th century, the German zoo and circus company of Carl Hagenbeck became
famous. Its zoo exhibited many animals, including never seen wild animals from non-European
continents that captured the imagination of the German citizens, especially the bourgeois class. At the
turn of the century, colonialism had become part of the cultural context and cultural life in Germany.
The scientific landscape had changed, too: biology, anthropology, and sociology developed as new
disciplines, often intertwining in language and concepts. Academies were established as scientific
societies in late 19th century, and members discussed current affairs of their disciplines. Both biology
and sociology had embraced the new evolution theory, for which Darwin on the one hand, and Malthus
on the other, had become the most popular figures (Kjaergaard 2011).
Zoos and circuses function as mediator between the sciences and (popular) culture; they stir
curiosity of the “exotic” other by entertaining people, thereby blending societal education (of race
theory) and cultural entertainment (Anhalt 2007). Carl Hagenbeck is the only historical name that is

4
5

6
7

For the reader-response theory cf. (Iser 1979; Jauss 1982).
In this essay, I understand decolonial theory in line with Walter Mignolo’s and Catherine Walsh’s analyses of “decoloniality”
(Mignolo 2018). My own approach is informed by the early Frankfurt School and their critical theory, especially M.
Horkheimer, Th. W. Adorno, W. Benjamin, and by E. Fromm’s studies on the authoritarian character. This essay is part of a
larger project that tries to develop a decolonial ethics through the lens of recognition and responsibility, which also serve as
my lens here. For the connection of critical theory and decolonial theory cf. (Mignolo 2007).
Quotes in this essay are from the English translations of both texts.
Ricœur put that first forward in (Ricœur 1981) In Time and Narrative and his later works, Paul Ricœur spells out the relation
of historical and literary narrative more extensively, but the basic idea of crossed reference remains the same. Cf. especially
(Ricœur 1983 and Ricœur 1992) For a broader discussion, in view of the question of moral identity and literary life stories cf.
(Haker 1999).
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presented in Kafka’s story, but his name is telling in the German colonial history. Hagenbeck was an
honorable member of the Berlin “Society of Anthropology, Ethnology, and Prehistory”, and he was well
connected to the most famous evolutionary scientist and theorist of race in Germany, Ernst Haeckel
(Weikart 2003).8 The epistemological overlap between biology, sociology, anthropology, and ethnology
created an opportunity for the German Academy of Science to pursue multiple inter-disciplinary
studies. Many scholars shared Haeckel’s view that “negroes” are “savages” and close kin to apes.9
Hierarchies are not only established between animals and humans but also among human peoples,
informed not to the least by Haeckel’s and his students’ regular interactions with Carl Hagenbeck who
let them use his “exhibits” for their studies.
Africa was only one of the continents Hagenbeck chose for his expeditions; peoples and animals
were exhibited either in the peoples shows, in the zoo in Hamburg, or in his traveling circus.10
Hagenbeck invested a lot of energy and money in his hunting expeditions, intended for the exhibitions
in Hamburg. His role in modern German culture at the turn of the century can hardly be underestimated:
he introduced a “new aesthetic experience” to the general audience, a new gaze at the animal as well
as other peoples who were categorized along the lines of the Darwinist theory of species, promoted by
Haeckel and others. Darwinism, race theory, and anthropology thereby shape the gaze at the other
as an othering: an exotic projection of one’s own fantasies. Apes play a particular role in this gaze,
because they are seen as the transitionary species between animals and humans, the “missing link”
between animals and humans. The ape–human relationship is fascinating and “uncanny” at the same
time, because for the evolution theorists, it is in this relationship that the otherness and the sameness
of the alien, almost human animal is negotiated. Hagenbeck experimented with the humanization of
apes; for example, he let Orangutans eat at his table. A chimpanzee called “Moritz” traveled with him
all over Europe, performing in zoos, circuses, and European royal courts. Dressed in a tailcoat,
“ . . . Moritz is always completely dressed ( . . . ) he sleeps in his bed, smokes his cigars, drinks
his wine, and when he travels, he travels in 2nd class cabin ( . . . ) right now, he is again gone
for a trip, because he has engagements in several European cities.” 11
This is the historical context of Kafka’s story. Like millions of others in Europe and North America,
Kafka had visited a peoples show, in his case in Prague in 1911, and the famous ape Moritz is echoed in
the story’s narrator Red Peter.12 In Kafka’s story, “an Academy” has invited an ape to report (berichten)
about his former life (literally: pre-life or Vorleben) as an ape. In the short story, Kafka constructs an
artistic double-speak that undermines the history of evolutionary biology by “deconstructing” the
linear hi-story13 within the report, at the same time fulfilling and ridiculing the task the Academy
has set for him. The ape thereby demonstrates his mastery of language and the poetic art of the
storyteller. He not only tells the history of his humanization as a history of subjugation but also destroys
the “missing link” theory, pointing to the epistemological faults and the moral failures engrained in
colonial-evolutionary theory and the colonizing practices of the European men.14

8
9
10

11
12

13
14

Weikart shows that Haeckel was one of the first who argued that “extermination” of several “races” was inevitable, thus
paving the way for the genocidal racism of German colonialism (and National Socialism).
For the connection of simianization and race theory cf. (Hund et al. 2015).
Peoples shows in which the “authentic life” of indigenous groups were to be represented are to be distinguished from
so-called “freak-shows”. Focusing on the “otherness” in form of disabilities or deviations from the norm of normality, these
shows were much more the topic of festivals.
Carl Hagenbeck records this in his book Von Tieren und Menschen, p. 220, published in 1908. Quoted in: (Anhalt 2007, p. 191)
(translation: HH).
Another context is the literary history of the early 19th century, especially E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Kreisleriana from 1804 that
entails a letter that an ape named Milo writes to his girlfriend Pipi from North America. In this essay, I only attend to the
German scientific context of race theory and colonialism; many interpretations point to the racialized antisemitism that
Kafka was very aware of and often addressed, ignoring, however, the connection of the German colonialism and race theory.
The hyphen marks the crossed reference of history and story that I am using throughout this essay.
Margot Norris has read the story in view of Darwin’s and Nietzsche’s theory of mimesis, which is not at the center of my
essay. Still, for the narrative strategy of the text her analysis is very helpful. Cf. (Norris 1980).
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2.2. The Ape’s Report
The “report” that Red Peter submits is a performative enactment that is correlated to the ape’s
performances in the vaudevilles. Red Peter demonstrates his mastery of language, which according
to Darwin, qualifies him as a human being and which is at the same time the symbol of intellectual
education, through multiple rhetorical techniques: he takes metaphors literally and uses them against
his audience; he comments and judges in sentences that appear to be descriptive; he hides behind the
veil of innocence while unmasking the contradictions of the linear progress culminating in the white
race; he speaks about the cruelties he has been subjected to, with calculated glimpses of repressed anger
inserted into the descriptive form of the report. The reader must imitate the narrator’s double-speak in
a double-reading: on the one hand, they must imagine themselves as part of the Academy-audience
who separates between the animal and the human, while on the other hand attending to the critique
that undermines the whole construct of race theory.15
Bowing to the academic customs, Red Peter thanks the Academy for the opportunity to report
to them: “You have honored me with the invitation to submit a report about my former life as an
ape.” (Kafka 1971, p. 81) This introduction entails multiple presuppositions regarding the origin of
the human: the Academy, Red Peter must assume from this invitation, presupposes that the origin
of human beings can be traced back to their past as animals, which humans have by now surpassed.
Asking for the “report”, Red Peter is once more exhibited as an exemplar of this pre-human past.
Red Peter’s narrated life story begins with his capture by Hagenbeck’s hunters at the Gold Coast
of Africa, historically the coast of the big human slave trade. Constantly correlating the origins of
humans (phylogenesis) with child development and formation through education (ontogenesis), Red
Peter expresses the dilemma of memory: the “former life” cannot be remembered; it is forgotten and
inaccessible for self-consciousness, sensed rather than known (I will return to this shortly). Red Peter
does not have the insights that the Academy has asked for: for that, “if I ever had the desire to run all
the way back there, I would have to scrape the hide off my body” (Kafka 1971, p. 81).
The “wild animals” are transported to Europe in cages on a ship, leaving Red Peter “sobbing”
and in constant pain. He remembers the torture, although he “can only sketch from hindsight and in
human words, what I then felt as an ape” (Kafka 1971, p. 83).16 As a “civilized” European human
being who will justify the torture as the price of civilization and forgive the torturers, he nods to the
Academy: “They’re good sorts, despite everything” (Kafka 1971, p. 84). Blending his “humanization”
with enslavement, coercion, and being dominated (“determined”) by others, as a rite de passage from
Africa to Europe (both geographical and symbolic), the “ape” reverses the trajectory from nature to
freedom: “avoidance of all willfulness”, i.e., any free will, in order “to move forward, to move forward!
Anything but standing still with raised arms, flattened against the sides of a crate.” (Kafka 1971, p. 84).
Mimesis, or imitation, and mimicry, or camouflage, two central concepts of evolution theory, become
Red Peter’s strategies of survival: survival is linked to imitation, the “otherness” transformed into the
“same”. “Nobody promised me that, if I became like them, the bars would be removed.” (Kafka 1971,
p. 85); “I was looking for a way out” (Kafka 1971, p. 87). Humanization is a far cry from individuation
as a unique human being; rather, it is a process of becoming like everybody else:
I watched those human beings walk back and forth, always the same faces, the same motions;
it often seemed to me as if it was just a single person. Well, that person or those persons were
walking around unmolested. (Kafka 1971, p. 85)

15
16

Posthumanist approaches and animal studies both provide valuable insights for ethics; for an overview of the current
discussion of the human–animal relation cf., for example, (Creedon 2014).
Cf. (Coetzee 2004) who, in the “lesson” The Rights of Animals, offers an intertextual commentary of Kafka’s story, reflecting the
ethical questions of torture in the context of the Shoah. There, Elisabeth Costello shocks her audience with the comparison
of treatment of animals and human beings.
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The ape, Red Peter interprets this transition, must become human because he cannot otherwise
survive. He therefore learns to shake hands—“shaking hands indicates candidness” (Kafka 1971, p. 82);
he learns to spit, “within the first few days” (Kafka 1971, p. 86), observing that these human beings
“mutually spit in each other’s faces; the only difference being that I licked my face clean afterwards,
and they didn’t.” (Kafka 1971, p. 86) He learns to smoke the pipe, to drink liquor from a bottle, and
finally, he utters his first word in human language.17 Following the aesthetic theory of Aristotle, the
peripeteia of his transformation is carefully prepared for and then staged as the performance of an
artist: “one evening, before a large group of spectators” Red Peter empties a bottle of the liquor as he
has learned, and then, intoxicated and not being himself, “no longer like someone in despair, but like
an artist . . . because I had to, because I had the urge to, because my senses were in an uproar“, he
utters his first word—“Hello”, the greeting formula of every “civilized” culture.18
Red Peter applies the same categories that the Academy uses in its scientific studies of race and
European civilization, i.e., the colonization of what they consider the un-civilized lands and cultures
they invade: ape and human, savages and Europeans, nature and history, forgetting and remembering,
freedom and necessity, sameness and difference etc. are all categories that shape Western (modern)
philosophy. Red Peter’s metamorphosis entails all elements of this process of civilization, and they
are listed meticulously. The result is the formation of an “average person”, an artist who becomes
his own persona, literally a mask, performing on the stages of European vaudevilles. Yet, the story
constantly disrupts and displaces the categories: at one time, the animal is free and the humans are
unfree; at another time, all differences are cancelled out; the speaking ape is indeed a human being, but
the human beings he speaks to act like apes; he is speaking as a human being and an ape; to become a
human being, he has to imitate the actions of humans, yet, as agents, humans seem to merely imitate
the life of apes. In short: the neat categories that separate the animal from the human collapse.
2.3. The Paradox of Recognition
Irony allows literature to subvert the categories of Western philosophy of history as well as the
categories of self-constitution as emergence of the sovereign self. Both categories are at the same
time deconstructed and newly constructed in Kafka’s story, to wit, in the visibility and audibility of
the story’s other, resting on the “double-speak” as the code of irony. Kafka does not merely reverse
the judgment: the animal nature, associated with power, force, and instinct is not an end that the
self can strive for to regain a “natural instinct”. Red Peter reminds the Academy: the “great past”
is immemorable and “forgotten”. Kafka, who was largely influenced by Freud’s writings on the
subconscious, has Red Peter demonstrate the hopelessness of reaching one’s “pre-history”: all that is
left is the “cool breeze” that once was a “storm that blew out of my past”.19 It is a remote memory
that every “wanderer on earth” feels as a “tickling in his heels: the little chimpanzee and the great
Achilles”. Whereas the Greek hero, who is echoed in the imagery of heroic masculinity of the white
man, is ultimately brought down because of this spot of his body, Red Peter interprets it as the drive
that is a trace of freedom and pleasure.20 The alternative humanism must therefore integrate both
dimensions: “speaking frankly: your own apehood, gentlemen, to the extent that there is anything like
that in your past, cannot be more remote from you than mine is from me.” (Kafka 1971, p. 81).
With this, Kafka acknowledges the intertwining of the “natural” and the “spiritual” dimension of
the self, unmasking the grand narrative of evolution as the myth of the European man; instead, he

17

18
19
20

In the theory of evolution, but also in the older approaches to natural history, language marks the decisive step in human
development. Its origin, however, had long been a riddle and the topic of many treatises. Cf., for example, Herder’s Treatise
on the Origin of Language (Herder 2002). Ethnologists such as Alexander of Humboldt took it as their task to explore the
languages of indigenous peoples.
Ironically, in the 18th century aesthetics of the artist as genius, this loss of control is a perquisite of “authentic” art.
Walter Benjamin uses this formulation in his “Thesis” on the philosophy of history, clearly echoing the critical interpretation
of the philosophy of progress (Benjamin 2003).
The German term kitzeln can also refer to something that makes one curious.
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is violent, cruel, and detached from any moral sense. In this myth of European civilization, it serves
the Europeans well to call the enslavement of other people liberation, and oppression a necessary
phase in the process of civilization. The construction of a teleological narrative of progress in history
requires a narrator, Red Peter reminds us, who constructs rather than discovers the “promises” of
history in the past. It presupposes that the “African” history is merely a pre-history. When history is
told from the perspective of the “other”, however, this narrative is debunked. The art of performance
(in the double sense of performance and performativity) enables Red Peter to “survive”, to wit, to be
socially recognized, but at the same time, it enables him to unmask the “figure” of Red Peter that the
Academy recognizes. Red Peter may not remember his “origins”, but he does remember who inflicted
upon him the wounds of the shotgun and torture, and it is no coincidence that Hagenbeck is identified
by name, as a historical figure of German colonial history. Early 20th century race theory did not
embrace the dialectic of nature and spirit that German idealism grappled with and saw as necessarily
intertwined dimensions of human nature. This is not to say that Kant, Hegel, or Schelling, did not
reiterate the well-known hierarchies of Western philosophy, associating “nature” with women and
non-Europeans, and “spirit” with maleness and the European culture. Kafka demonstrates, however,
how different the philosophy of history becomes when the story is told from the perspective of those
who are dehumanized as animals or “sub-humans”. In the reception history of the short story in
Germany, it was mostly read in light of Kafka’s Jewishness and the racialized antisemitism that had
emerged together with the reception of Darwin and social Darwinism since the late 19th century,
and after the Shoah, the animal metaphors seemed to support this allegorical reading. While this
is certainly an obvious reading of the text, it forgets the intertwining of racialized antisemitism and
racialized colonialism.
Once in Europe, Kafka’s ape becomes a true follower of the enlightened, European culture: “That
progress! That penetration of rays of knowledge from all sides into my awakening brain! I won’t
deny it: it made me happy!” (Kafka 1971, p. 87) But he also internalizes the habitual attitude of the
European master: “Through an effort that hasn’t found its match on earth to the present day, I have
attained the educational level of an average European.” (Kafka 1971, p. 87) Now, at “the pinnacle of my
career”, (Kafka 1971, p. 82) a point at which his “success probably can’t get much greater”, (Kafka 1971,
p. 88) he is one of the honorable members of society, receiving invitations to banquets, to academic
societies, living a life in prosperity, in short: he is recognized in the bourgeois society of early 20th
century. Kafka makes sure the reader notices that the ape who is “honored” to speak to the Academy
is morally corrupt. Looking back at the many incidents of having “drained many a fine bottle of red
wine” with Carl Hagenbeck (Kafka 1971, p. 82), Red Peter is proud of the social recognition he has
gained. He echoes the European judgment that this was “worth the trouble” (Kafka 1971, p. 88). He
does not seek anybody’s “opinion”, merely wishes to “disseminate information”, merely “making a
report” (ibid.). When he comes back from his public engagement, in his private life he engages in “ape”
acts, sexuality that seems to be exempt from being “humanized” and must therefore be tabooed. Red
Peter “has a good time” with his female companion, in an “ape fashion”:
“When I come home late at night from banquets, learned societies or friendly gatherings, a
little half-trained female chimpanzee is waiting for me and I have a good time with her, ape
fashion; in the daytime I don’t want to see her, because her eyes have that deranged look
which bewildered trained animals have; I’m the only one who recognizes it, and I can’t stand
it.” (Kafka 1971, p. 87)
The woman’s gaze is “deranged” and “bewildered”, which only he recognizes. For both, the male
and the female human, social recognition is a granted gesture that can be withdrawn at any time—a
conditional status that conceals the humiliation and the habitual effects of moral misrecognition. Fanon
saw the paradox of recognition clearly:
“The Negro is a slave who has been allowed to assume the attitude of a master. The white
man is a master who has allowed his slaves to eat at his table.” (Fanon 1967, p. 219)
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This gaze of the tortured, captured, and raped human being entails the moral verdict over the
European, repressive, violent “humanism”. The “sub-human’s” rise to humanity does indeed entail a
limited social recognition, but it does not transcend the structure of power that justifies moral harm
and the damage of a person’s identity as “collateral damage” of historical progress—in other words, it
does not change the underlying biological racism but merely allows for the “survival” of the one who
adapts to the “superior” human behavior (Bernstein 2015; Mills 2015). An ethically valid concept of
recognition must therefore not only critically attend to these structures of domination and coerced
submissions, but it must break entirely with them.
For Darwin—as for Kafka—humanity is not only tied to language but also to the moral sense of
shame. Shame is the opposite of the master’s gaze, and it starkly contrasts with the voyeurism of exotic
animals and peoples that Hagenbeck’s exhibitions wanted the audience to adopt.21 Shame, in contrast
to the self-distancing, aesthetic experience of the voyeur, means to see oneself from the perspective of
the other or from an internalized moral perspective. Red Peter, who has done everything to prove
that he is not the “former ape” as the Academy will always see him, but a “human being” just like the
Europeans, has so internalized the habitus of coloniality that he interacts with his companion with
the violence and domination he has been taught. On the other hand, he remains ambiguous towards
her, appalled by the humiliation he has experienced himself, too. Repressing this connection between
himself and the female other, he demonstrates the “success” of his education; his apparent discomfort,
ethically termed “bad conscience,” however, remains as the potential to be or become a different kind
of a moral self, namely one that would indeed be challenged by the other (cf. Derrida 2002).
2.4. Decolonizing Recognition: Critique and Renewal
Over the last decades, recognition theory has emerged as an important normative concept of
personal and social relations as well as political or legal equality. Featured as a central concept in
the works of Western modern philosophers such as Rousseau, Fichte, and Hegel, recognition theory
has been taken up in multiple contemporary works, most famously by Axel Honneth (Honneth
1995) who argues for recognition as a normative concept of social theory, but also by Charles Taylor
(Taylor 1992) who argues for a politics of recognition in multicultural societies, and more recently by
Paul Ricœur who develops an ethics of recognition (Ricœur 2005).22 In the US, recognition theory
is predominantly discussed as a strand of the politics of recognition, multiculturalism, and identity
politics, often centered on how Charles Taylor framed it.23 In this, postcolonial studies are no different
(Balaton-Chrimes and Stead 2017; Markell 2003). In these studies, Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White
Masks is a prominent reference text for critique because the politics of recognition is seen as one element
of colonial power, concealing the well-known colonial gaze of misrecognition by framing it as the
paternalistic generosity of the colonial and neocolonial powers. And indeed: as long as recognition is
only expanded to “other”, “different”, or “alien” cultures, it does not change the position or question
the underlying Western, European, or Anglo-American identity as superior to the “other” cultures.
Coloniality is constituted by an ethical structure that I call conditional recognition or recognition
under the condition of terms set by only one party, in contrast to mutual or moral recognition. A critique
of the concept of recognition is therefore necessary when it conceals an underlying misrecognition,
disrespect, and humiliation, grounded in an epistemology of superiority and inferiority. In contrast
to this concept that is often associated with a Western “politics of recognition”, an ethically sound
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As noted above, John Coetzee addresses shame and voyeurism in The Problem of Evil, a staged intervention by the writer
Costello that emphasizes the intertwining of racialized colonialism, racialized antisemitism, and all kinds of (sexual) violence
based on power asymmetries among humans. Cf. (Coetzee 2004; Haker 2003).
Feminist philosopher Margaret Urban Walker analyzed different forms of moral recognition in the context of Strawson’s
reactive feelings, thereby departing from the Hegelian reading that is the dominant lens of continental philosophy’s
recognition theory. Cf. (Walker 1998).
Honneth’s reinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of recognition is therefore also mostly read with this lens, causing many
misunderstandings but also fruitful debates. Cf. (Honneth 1995; Fraser and Honneth 2003; Honneth et al. 2010).
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concept of recognition must be grounded in a radically different phenomenological and hermeneutical
understanding of encounters and interactions. The colonial epistemology and social, ethical, and
cultural hierarchy of superiority and inferiority generates patterns and structures of domination, in
which only one party has the power of defining the constitutive rules of practices, with multiple
ramifications for the religious, cultural, social, economic, and political structures of pluralistic and
globalized societies. Ethics provides the necessary conceptual tools for a structural and social–ethical
critique of misrecognition or disrespect that renders even instrumental hierarchies (in companies,
social institutions, or bureaucracies) prone to harm and injustice and therefore in need of procedures
that protect the moral equality of all, and that protect, for example, critics of violence and injustices.
This means, furthermore, that recognition concepts that are grounded in value judgments about
one’s own and the other’s worth, one’s merit or one’s contribution to society, for example, are also
misleading—such concepts presuppose that persons, social groups, religions, or cultures could be
weighed on a scale of value.
Moral recognition must mean something else. In a phenomenological approach, Bernhard
Waldenfels, among others, has argued that recognition requires a particular response, namely one that
is attentive and respectful of the other (Waldenfels 1994, 2002, 2006, 2011). Since any perception is
concrete, another (animal and/or human) being is perceived as welcoming or threatening, invitation or
intrusion etc.; responses, too, cannot be abstracted from the address (and encounter) of the other—both
are like rolled-up stories that need to be unrolled or unfolded, as Husserl’s student Wilhelm Schapp
argued (Schapp 1953). Yet, since perceptions are learned and habituated, shaped by the social norms to
which one is adapted, phenomenology alone does not necessarily break the spell of misrecognition. An
ethically grounded concept of recognition must be understood as an encounter in which both parties
are open to each other and willing to be transformed. In contrast, in Kafka’s story the colonial premise
renders only the ape in need of being transformed or “lifted up” to the level of the “humans” while
his counterparts cannot even think they, too, could be transformed by the encounter with the ape.
Reciprocity is not necessarily mutuality. Misrecognition may function differently in different spheres,
but its premise is always the same, namely that one party is convinced that their mere presence to
the other is a “gift” that carries with it a sense of entitlement, often spelled out as the other’s work,
property, freedom, or body.
Not every asymmetry, however, is an expression of conditional recognition, as psychoanalyst
Jessica Benjamin has shown convincingly: in her example of breastfeeding, inter-action is seen as
“attunement” between mother and child that transforms both in the attentiveness to the respective
other without denying the asymmetry of the relation. Recently, Jessica Benjamin has sharpened her
previous works and reinterpreted recognition as a broader concept (Benjamin 2017) that goes “beyond
the doer and done-to” understanding. My understanding of ethical recognition is informed by her
work, especially by her emphasis of the commitment to act together and be transformed together in
and through interactions, in order to create something new.
Waldenfels’ work is a similarly promising step to reinterpret the perception, experience, and
encounter of the “alien” within oneself and the “alien” other. In contrast to Benjamin’s concept that
emphasizes the shared space of interaction, Waldenfels emphasizes the passive Widerfahrnis or pathos
of experience as address followed by the active re-action as response, however this may look like.
Waldenfels’ “responsoric” phenomenology describes the “pause”, the “diastasis” between the passive
experience and the re-action as creating a deferment that cannot be overcome: address and response
cannot completely overlap, as Benjamin’s “attunement” seems to suggest, and hence it creates an
infinite process of understanding and acting, and acting together. With respect to reflective responses,
Waldenfels, like Benjamin, stresses the necessity of attentiveness (Aufmerksamkeit, Achtsamkeit), which
adds a sensual layer to the concept of respect (Achtung), and Benjamin adds the necessity of witnessing
in the case of past injuries that have been inflicted upon the other, which creates several overlaps of
practical–ethical and therapeutic work. Waldenfels’ approach gives the ethical concept of recognition a
phenomenological foundation that complements the insights from psychoanalysis.
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Paul Ricœur who is closest to my interest in an ethical interpretation of the self-other encounters,
acknowledges the effects of coloniality (though not in these terms) by emphasizing the negative effects
of misrecognition. Ricœur insists on the difference between reciprocity and mutuality, examining the
epistemological and social roots of the concept of recognition and misrecognition. In the encounter of
the European settlers with the colonies, a “grand narrative” (Lyotard 1984) was constructed around
the concept of “aid” of development and civilization as the gift of progress that the colonizers bring
to the “undeveloped” countries they politically claim to be the “colonies” of their empires. In return
of this original “gift”, the colonies owe the colonizers gratitude, land, labor, or their bodies, if not
their lives. The Europeans never asked whether their presence was even welcomed. Moreover, they
chose the “return gifts” themselves, and when these were not given voluntarily, they declared them
a debt. In effect, land grabs were called “protection treaties”, physical violence and brutality were
called disciplinary punishment or “educational” measures, sexual abuse and rape were considered an
entitlement that did not affect the victims. Resistance was considered illegitimate, ungrateful, and
ultimately a crime. This understanding of recognition as the givers’ claim on a return of their “gift,” in
“gratitude” and submission to one’s oppression, creates the double consciousness that is reiterated in
the double-speech of the artist; to agree to the moral misrecognition is the only way out when faced
with the alternative of death or suicide. The “Academy” expects the “former ape” to be thankful
for his humanization; having become a master in his own right, Red Peter believes he, too, is now
entitled to the services of the “half-tamed” chimpanzee. In both relationships, the former ape and
the female chimpanzee are not free, and certainly not recognized in an ethical understanding of the
term: entitlement, the posture as the “giver”, and the expectation of gratitude is the condition that
defines the relationships. Misrecognition is therefore not merely reification or dehumanization; it is a
radical self-centeredness of the party that sets the rules and upholds their unchangeable indifference
towards the other, while at the same time utilizing them for their own ends. Being misrecognized
therefore means that one’s identity is pre-defined and ascribed; to actively misrecognize means to
create a “reciprocity” that is based upon this predefined hierarchical relation.
In contrast, the mutual work of recognition and the transformation of both parties’ understanding
of each other as a result of it can be compared to a two-way translation. Ricœur’s works on translation
as a hermeneutic and ethical concept, first developed in view of the translation of texts and in his
later works used to interpret the possibility of understanding among strangers in pluralistic and
multicultural societies, is especially instructive for the further development of a decolonial narrative
ethics. I follow Alison Scott-Bauman who has shown in her comprehensive works on Ricœur how
hermeneutics and ethics are interwoven (Scott-Baumann 2009, 2013). In an essay on Ricœur’s take on
translation she writes:
Translation from one language to another provides both a metaphor and a real mechanism for
tolerance, for ‘gifting’ oneself to the other. Ricœur presents the act of translating languages
as a two-way ethical paradigm for action, in which the existence of the other must be
acknowledged in the form of respect for the ways in which the other expresses him/herself.
(Scott-Baumann 2010, p. 72)
Ricœur accepts the imperfection, finitude, and the “unrecognizable” otherness in this mutual work
of understanding that is, I hold, at the same time the mutual work of recognition. The “unbridgeable
gap” should exactly not, following Ricœur’s understanding, impede but rather enable a “humane” way
of agency, to wit, the capability to act and the acknowledgment of one’s—and the other’s—fallibility:
the translator, Ricœur holds, unable to find the “perfect translation”, “instead tries and tries again,
accepting partial success in the ultimate untranslatability of some of the meaning.” (Scott-Baumann 2010,
p. 80). The same is true, I hold, for the work of recognition as interaction and mutual transformation of
the interacting agents or groups.
Listening to stories, for example in testimonies or in oral history, or reading historical documents,
reports, letters, diaries, short stories, or novels certainly requires a responsiveness that can be schooled
in the practice of reading (Gadamer 1975; Derrida 2004; Attridge 2010, 2017). Literature offers an
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indispensable way to understand, interpret, and practice the encounter with the other (the foreign, the
alien) in an aesthetic, i.e., experimental fashion, that in a way explores as much one’s own alienness as
the alienness of others. With respect to exploring the past, cultural memory, too, requires hermeneutical
work, enabling the infinite process of understanding through the process of being addressed by the
narratives of the past and the attentiveness in the response through a “responsoric” reading. In the
context of narrative ethics, reading has indeed been interpreted as responsibility to and for the “other”
(Attridge 2004, 2010). Ethically speaking, this is indispensable especially as part of a decolonizing
virtue ethics that is aimed to transform the habitual formations of the normative order of whiteness,
racism, and coloniality that is so deeply ingrained in the cultures shaped by the structures of conditional
recognition, which has turned out to be just another way of misrecognition. As postcolonial writers
from Fanon (Fanon 1967), Appiah (Appiah 2008) to Mbembe (Mbembe 2017) and African-American
writers like Patricia Williams (Williams 1991) show, racial and colonial thinking shapes both those who
remain structurally privileged and those who are always seen as inferior, in need to be “lifted up”
before they are regarded as equal. But equality is impossible when it is based on the “inclusion” of
others or the “expansion” of rights without changing the underlying epistemology and ethics; change
will not happen, because the colonial past is habitually present in both parties and not addressed as
such. This is the lesson of Red Peter who will always be the “former” ape.
In the next section, I will turn to a novel that was written in the midst of the radical questioning of
the Nazi generation in Germany, culminating in the student revolts in the late 1960s. Uwe Timm’s
novel, published in 1978, must be seen in this context: it wrestles with the unspeakable cruelty that was
committed by Germans who after World War II were often seen as “honorable people” of the German
society, maintaining their positions as judges, scientists, engineers, bankers, or entrepreneurs after
having quickly put to rest the crimes against humanity which they committed or were complicit with
during Hitler’s dictatorship. The Nazi ideology is present everywhere in the novel Morenga, raising
the question whether Germany’s colonial genocide in the early 20th century was a harbinger of the
Nazi crimes and which therefore must be seen in continuity with their antisemitism and the Nazi
ideology. Explicitly, however, Timm tells the almost-forgotten history of the genocide itself. Timm’s
novel represents the radical shift of political ethics that had taken place between 1945 and 1978. But at
the same time, it is a cautionary tale with respect to Germany’s history and the dangers of selective
historical memory. Timm uses the metaphors of animals and humans as the dividing line between
the Germans/Europeans and the Nama and Herero, and similar to Kafka’s story, he undermines the
colonial and racial distinction utilizing multiple rhetorical strategies. Overwriting the colonial with a
critical perspectives in the novel, Timm echoes the critique of European civilization and the underlying
development theory that guided Kafka’s story, too. In Timm’s novel, however, the colonial habitus
is spelled out on multiple levels, unmasking the structures of misrecognition in the religious, social,
economic, and political elements of coloniality.
3. Uwe Timm: Morenga
The German post-Holocaust “memory culture” that emerged since the 1970s, in stark contrast to
the silence after World War II, is often quoted as an exemplary, collective, and national effort of dealing
with the atrocities of the past. With respect to Germany’s history of colonialism, however, amnesia and
aphasia dominate up to today. The “forgotten” history includes the first genocide of the 20th century:
between 1904 and 1908,24 German soldiers destroyed the Herero and Nama cultures almost completely
in a colonial war,25 detaining the surviving people in concentration camps, and starving them to death
on Shark Island, all this as a declared policy of the German Empire that had been instated in 1871.

24
25

Some older studies state the period as ending in 1907, but I follow the thorough analysis provided by (Kossler 2015).
The Herero population of 80,000 was decimated to 15,000; and the Nama population was reduced from 20,000 to 10,000.
Figures from https://ahrp.org/germanys-colonial-genocide-in-namibia/.
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The German government did not recognize the genocide of the Nama and Herero until 2016, and
notwithstanding multiple other efforts to rectify its colonial history, Germany has been sued by the
descendants of the Nama and Ovaherero over reparations.26
From a historical perspective, this genocide precedes the racial politics of the National Socialists
that unfolded under Hitler a few decades later, yet the underlying habitus is intertwined in many
ways. For example, during and after the colonial genocide, thousands of human body parts, including
decapitated heads of Nama and Herero, were transported from the colony of German South West
Africa (GSWA) to Berlin, becoming part of the race and eugenics studies of German scientists. Eugen
Fischer, then director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, who in the 1930s became Hitler’s
chief “racial hygienist”, wrote his dissertation on the Rehobot “Bastards” in 1908 with the support of
the Prussian Academy of Science (Fischer 1913).27 It took the German government a century to return
the human remains to Namibia, and the German museums have only recently begun negotiations
about the return of artifacts the Prussians often bought from the other colonial powers. Without a
doubt, responsibility for the past that is at the center of Germany’s memory culture, and a politics
and ethics of remembrance requires the acknowledgment, apologies, and reparations on the side of
the German state. But there is no memory or remembrance without a historical narrative, or more
precisely, multiple narratives that must be told from different perspectives.28
Literature plays an important role as a medium to shape and promote a nation’s cultural
imagination, both as national ideology or as its critique. In Germany, colonial stories such as Peter
Moor’s Travels to the Southwest, a bestselling novel written in 1906, were part of the German colonial
narrative of supremacy that reflected the “imperial” and “genocidal gaze” of German colonialism,
as Elisabeth Baer has coined it (Baer 2017).29 Unsurprisingly, in postwar German literature theory
and works of German literature, biological racism and white supremacy was debunked as ideology.
Culturally, it was supposed to disappear as habitus (Bourdieu 1994; Celikates 2012) through strong
humanistic education programs.30 All the more surprising is the fact that Germany’s colonial history
never played a big role in these reflections. Narrative Ethics as a literary and ethical approach must
therefore be reflective and critical on both levels, i.e., in the aesthetic analysis of literature and in the
ethical analysis of the values and/or convictions underlying a literary work.
Morenga is a documentary novel that entails multiple narrative forms and multiple narrative
voices. It can be read as the story of the (fictional) German Veterinary Lieutenant Gottschalk’s military
placement in the German colony of South West Africa (GSWA) from October 1904 to September
1907.31 As such, the novel is a counter-story to the colonial novel Peter Moor’s Travel to South West
Africa, exploring the history of the Nama leader Morenga.32 Apart from the two juxtaposed figures,
Morenga and Gottschalk, the novel entails two different approaches to history, which are offered in
numerous stories, told without guidance from the assumed narrator how to read them. The narrator
broadly follows Gottschalk’s time in the colony and the places of his deployment, but the chronology
and topology is disrupted by multiple side-stories that the reconstruction requires an extraordinary
effort. With this strategy, the reader’s assumptions are constantly disoriented, to the effect that the
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Unfortunately, the Nama and Ovaherero also fight against the obliteration in Namibia itself, where their history is being
“overwritten” by the official memory of the liberation struggle from South Africa in the 1980s. Cf. (Hamrick and Duschinski
2018).
Cf. For a concise overview of the history: http://ahrp.org/germanys-colonial-genocide-in-namibia/.
In this, I follow the diatopical hermeneutics that has been introduced by (de Sousas Santos 2014).
Baer’s study examines the ties of the GSWA genocide to the Shoah through the lens of literature. She dedicates a chapter to
“Peter Moor” and reads Timm’s novel as an intertextual commentary to this early colonial novel.
In West-Germany, the new habitus was tied to human dignity and human rights while in East-Germany, it was depicted as
the Socialist identity. In contrast to the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, biological racism had no place in either
part of the country.
Gottschalk, like all other German figures, is not granted a first name in the novel, while many Herero and Nama have
Christian first names. Gottschalk is a common German name and literally means “God’s joke”.
Cf. for the overall context and the focus on intertextuality: (Baer 2017).
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cohesion of the plot, the authenticity of characters, the linearity of time, the perception of space, and
the meaning of words all lose their narrative function of orientating the reader. On the one hand,
the novel resembles a Bildungsroman, a formation story of Gottschalk. As a young German man, he
imagines Africa as an exotic world that he experiences, for example, in form of the spices sold in his
father’s colonial store, sparking his interest in this “foreign” world. Over the course of the novel,
however, he transforms from a naïve, adventure-seeking man to a deeply disillusioned soldier who
sees the German war against the Herero and Nama as a crime against humanity. Observing the
starving Nama in the concentration camps and the arbitrary killings, trying to stand at the margins of
the battles, Gottschalk is paralyzed in indecision and inaction. With respect to the history of German
colonialism, the novel entails, on the other hand, several historical documents and multiple stories
depicting the interactions of European colonizers with the different tribes, strictly told from a European
perspective. These stories trace the main elements of German colonialism from the early 19th century
until 1918, when Germany loses its colonies after World War I. The novel therefore entails a chronicle
of the German history of colonialization, told in fragments, in which fiction and historical documents
constantly intersect. It reflects the underlying religious, economic, and political epistemologies of
colonialism. This epistemology is challenged repeatedly, with inserted testimonies to the Nama and
Herero narratives of their history.
Gottschalk’s story, which structures the main timeline and spatial sites of the novel, is therefore
interrupted by multiple stories from different perspectives, assembled by the narrator without a strict
order, contradicting in the narrative style the German obsession with “order”, which is the topic of
several conversations and reflections in the novel. While Gottschalk’s story certainly provides a thread
through the novel, it intersects constantly with the title figure Morenga who is implicitly present
throughout the novel, appearing and disappearing just like the historical leader of the Nama guerilla
war appears and disappears in the war. At the beginning of the novel, the narrator points the reader
to the difficulty of finding historical sources of Morenga’s life, thereby revealing that historiography
cross-reference with fiction in any narrative, as Ricœur had argued (Ricœur 1988); the answer to his
question “Who was Morenga?” is given by a “District officer of Gibeon”: Morenga’s life story is largely
unknown—or unknown to the German sources. What is known seems fragmentary and sparse: there
are rumors about the legendary status he has gained in GSWA, that people associate superhuman
powers with him, that he is also called Marengo, that he is the son of a Herero father and Nama mother,
a Christian who may have been educated in a missionary school. A little later, more information is
added: Morenga, the reader now learns, has indeed been educated in a missionary school, he speaks
two colonial languages fluently, English and Dutch, and he also understands German, contradicting
the imagery of the uneducated “savage” that is spread in Germany (Timm 2003, p. 28). Like Red Peter,
Morenga masters language well, using irony and sarcasm in letters he writes to the military (ibid.), and
like Gottschalk, he keeps a diary that is, however, preserved only in fragments. Since central elements
of colonialism are depicted in the novel, I will give some examples of how the novel tells the history
of coloniality as the German habitus of misrecognition, before turning to Morenga’ and Gottschalk’s
intersecting story.
3.1. Colonial Life I: Religion
Missionaries from the Lutheran Rhenish Mission begin their missionary work on the African
continent in the early 1800s, and the novel painfully describes the priests’ ignorance and indifference
towards the Herero and Nama, contradicting their self-perception as the saviors of their souls. The
novel therefore calls for the analysis of theology’s own history that often conceals its complicity and
role in colonialism, and rarely reflects its theological racism.33

33

Mills rightly explains that theological racism is one important element of the different facets of racism. Cf. (Mills 2015).
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The story of the (fictional) missionary Gorth is a cautionary tale of the German mission in Africa.
Ironically, the Nama compare his physiognomy to a Merino sheep and a “friendly and undemanding
animal” (Timm 2003, p. 89); unlike the “savages”, he never learns to speak or understand the Nama
language. He is drawn to “Africa” as a young boy when he sees “three naked little black children
[who] were sitting around a nest containing three ostrich eggs” (Timm 2003, p. 93) in the Missionary
newspaper that his father subscribed to at his home in Heddersheim. The Church’s gaze on the
“Africans” is paternalistic, infantilizing, and dehumanizing: “At the entrance to the church stood
a small metal statue of a nodding black boy, with a slot for coins in his head” (ibid.). Gorth, who
arrives at the English Missionary Bethany in 1852, has his own ideas of civilization, which are told
with scathing irony, contradicting the “humanist” mission: he has brought a piano and some pigs, the
latter aimed at countering the Islamic missionary by introducing pork to the “Hottentots”.34 He is
disappointed that the “Africans” do not live up to his exotic imaginations, the women in particular,
and he imagines to take a Nama called Lukas to Germany for a fundraising campaign on behalf of
the African “savage”, which resembles the peoples shows’ voyeurism, sublimated by the religious
charity work:
“tall and well built, with a high, broad forehead, and a calm, direct gaze. This figure
demonstrated, so Gorth felt, the ennobling and formative effect of Christianity, how it could
turn a savage into an upright human being. With a Lukas like this, he could tour German
cities and missionary societies.” (Timm 2003, p. 95)
The religious education has not always the intended effect, as an English missionary, ironically
called Rumbottle, observes, unmasking the Church’s education program as theological racism:
“natives, once they could read the holy scriptures, always picked out those passages that
were aimed against the rich, the authorities, and in the end against even the missionary
church itself. So sects kept arising. The only way to avoid this problem was not to teach
the natives to read and write in the first place. And this in fact was Rumbottle’s approach.”
(Timm 2003, p. 100)
Missionaries shape the way Germans see the “Africans” in many ways. Gorth writes letters to his
fiancée, depicting the way the Nama raise their children (without the disciplining violence known
in Prussian Germany), how they go about their life, and have their own tradition transmitted in the
history of their cattle. In this history, the lines between humans and animals are blurred, oxen can speak,
remember, and narrate the story of the tribes who are traditionally cattle traders, and these stories entail
the genealogy of the Nama people that the Germans are ignorant of because they do not understand
their language.35 The traditional wisdom of the Nama cultural history is thereby juxtaposed to the
paternalistic gaze of the missionaries, just as the earnest study of the bible by the newly-baptized is
juxtaposed to the colonial racist theology of the missionaries. Ultimately, the intercultural encounter is
shaped by misunderstandings and the lack of effort on the part of the German missionaries to change
or correct their own pre-judgments through the experiences with the Nama and Herero. While the life
of the latter is changed radically, it never occurs to the missionaries that they, too, could learn from
their African counterparts. The oppressive colonial missionary hermeneutics prevents a “diatopical”
(de Sousas Santos 2014 hermeneutics to emerge, thereby also preventing an intercultural theology based
on moral recognition and responsoric encouters of alienness in the context of the missionary work.

34
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The denigrative term of the Nama is used in the German protocols of the army, in politics, the writings of colonial business,
the missionaries, and in German culture. I still heard it as a child in the 1970s, albeit without understanding the connection
to the history of Germany. I will use it here when the novel does that, too. The narrator points to the fact that the “Hottentot”
are the Nama right at the beginning of the novel (3).
Interestingly, Timm’s text could be easily read as a commentary to Nietzsche’s concept of memory and history, e.g., regarding
the “ruminating” memory, the human exposure to the documents of the past and the alien, and the tricks of the historian to
pretend his mastery of the material. Cf. for an analysis of Nietzsche’s concept (Meyer 1998).
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3.2. Colonial Life II: Trade and Capitalism
Morenga entails multiple intersecting narratives of the missionary work in the colonies with the
trading of colonial goods in European countries. Timm’s narrative strategy is to bring together multiple
stories from different places and times in the nonlinear, associative way of memory. Often, they are
initiated by Gottschalk who hears names or fragments of stories that are then unfolded in relative
independence of his consciousness, or they are stories associated with the places he visits, the people
he encounters, all told by the narrator who assembles them as a historian. One of these stories concerns
the development of the colonial trade in the 19th century in accordance with the economic theory
of Adam Smith. The “end” of biological race theory, generally dismissed as scientific theory after
the Shoah, is thereby contrasted with the continuity of an economic theory that still shapes, at least
in general, the rules of capitalism; neocolonial exploitation still defines much of late 20th century’s
capitalist economies, raising the question, of course, how post-racial Western societies can even be in
theory if they still function under an economic theory that intersects so closely with colonialism.
In mid 19th century, colonial goods become symbols of bourgeois life in Europe. In addition
to exotic spices and foods, metals that are extracted from the mines (Morenga, for example, is said
to have worked in a mine before the rebellion), the textile industry and fashion companies are also
highly dependent on the goods from the colonies. One of the stories told in the novel is emblematic
of the colonial trade with the tribes of GSWA; it begins with one particular good, namely ostrich
feathers, and expands to the whole system of colonial exploitation in 19th century capitalist economy.
In 1859, the narrator tells us, ostrich feathers become utensils of women’s hats in Paris and Berlin,
the cultural centers of the day, and quickly become the “must haves” in the bourgeois circles. These
hats are often depicted by the Parisian impressionists in their paintings of the city life, which Timm
may presuppose as collective knowledge of his readers. They are, of course, imported from the
African colonies, and function as an introduction to the world of colonial trade, exemplified by the
businessman Klügge, in the German language connotated to “klug” or clever. The story of the ostrich
feathers is, however, interrupted by a long detour that enables the narrator to give his account of
colonial history: Klügge starts out his colonial business in Cape Town in 1842, after an apprenticeship
as accountant in Düsseldorf.36 He first works in an import–export business, trading colonial goods
such as buttons, belts, and combs, and later goes independent, trading buttons, pots, and pans for
cattle. This business does not result in the wealth he has imagined for himself, not the least because he
encounters the “natives” as smart traders, “something Jewish, which was not surprising, since all the
Hottentots were semitic in origin” (Timm 2003, p. 146); their economy is based on sustainable rather
than throw-away consumers. This is not an attitude that capitalism welcomes: for example, Klügge
complains, the natives have “the annoying tendency to search for any button they had lost—and they
were constantly losing them—until they found it.” (ibid.). Similar to the ostrich feather, the buttons
are an allegory for the requirements of particular consumers in a capitalist economy, and this cannot
function when it becomes part of a lifeform that has another purpose than consumption: Klügge is
horrified to see that the search “could take hours or even days, it didn’t matter, it became a form of
public entertainment, turned into a sort of small-scale festival until the button was found.” (ibid.).
Observing this uneconomic behavior, Klügge concludes that capitalism will not work with sustainable
goods: “This willingness to waste time made any long-term business plans impossible. All the natives
wanted were the bare necessities and then they would laze away the day.” (Timm 2003, p. 147). He
therefore turns to the business idea of selling brandy, utilizing its unsustainable value:
“Ideally, sale and consumption occurred almost simultaneously, and with brandy thirst was
quenched in a way that produced an even greater thirst afterward, so that the disparity
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The narrator is precise in locating the homes and towns in Germany, illuminating that the stories he tells are grounded in the
German terra cognita, whereas the names of the GSWA’s missionaries and towns often sound like a terra incognita to the
German readers.
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between drink and thirst grew increasingly greater, and the intervals of sobriety increasingly
shorter, supply and demand driving each other constantly upward. Here was an economic
impulse of compelling and therefore beautiful logic.” (ibid.)
In Cape Town, Klügge finds an English business partner, Morris, who immediately exploits him
for his own purposes and his own business of trading alcohol. But he convinces Klügge to work for
him in Windhoek, because the “savages” must first learn to “think in economic terms” (Timm 2003,
p. 148). The Rhenish Mission, Morris states, is helpful in this endeavor, especially in its battle against
the “cattle cult”—the alternative to the Christian tradition. Christianity is not enough to educate the
tribes in modern economy, the Englishman Morris lectures Klügge (and the reader). In order to build a
flourishing business, the “awakening” of new needs is required, and the economy must transition
to the “more highly-developed labor” that Adam Smith had introduced, i.e., the Capitalist division
of labor. For this transition from subsistence economy to capitalism, the Nama need to engage in
“systematic cattle theft on economic principles” instead of theft for food (ibid.). In other words, the
capitalist mechanism of buying on credit had to be installed:
It was necessary, then, to awake the Hottentot’s self-interest to create new needs; they were a
people capable of pleasures, the wares would have to be given to them on credit to begin with,
the payment would come later in the form of cattle, which, since they had so few themselves,
would have to be stolen from the Hereros, for which they would in turn need powder and
lead and guns, for which they would also have to pay in cattle. [ . . . .] Everything was in
place, but how were these tired limbs to be set dancing? Brandy, said Klügge, taking his
hand from his throat.
Exactly, said Morris, brandy will awaken the slumbering market. (Timm 2003, p. 149)
Citing Smith’s economic mechanism, Morris ends his economic lecture with the core
colonial-Capital principle: “in the end an invisible hand will create humanistic acts out of even
the most selfish motives.” (Timm 2003, p. 150).
Klügge and Morris begin to trade “utility” and “beauty” goods in Windhoek with the Nama in
order to “awaken” both their economic and aesthetic senses, as Morris calls it.37 The business thrives
for quite some time, not the least because of the help of the missionary who not only preaches to his
flock: “Have dominion over the earth”, but also that “trade and traffic” are pleasing in the eyes of
God (Timm 2003, p. 152). Alcohol becomes a defining exchange good in the colonial cattle trade, but
Smith’s “invisible hand” results in the alienation that German economic philosopher Marx describes
around the same time in Europe and which Timm evokes indirectly, resting on instrumental rationality,
the objectifying, economic gaze that measures every practice for its exchange value. In the colony,
too, the Capitalist economy seeps into all practices, rendering the tribes addicted to alcohol; sugar,
needed for the black-market brewing of beer, becomes the currency of social relationships (even the
women, Klügge complains, now want to be paid for their sexual services, or paid more than before).
After a while, however, violence breaks out between the Herero and the colonists:38 public floggings,
torture, and shootings of thieves demonstrate the rising tensions. On the other side, white farmers
begin to complain about too many (and hence, too cheap) cattle being channeled into the market due to
Morris’ business, ultimately forcing the Governor to intervene. Timm thereby explains the conditions
that lead to the colonial war with the Herero: the missionary work, the trade, the emerging modern
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Timm knows that readers are familiar with the exotic pictures of African woman in European dresses, hats, and other
utensils, complementing other postcards that often show bare-breast women looking into the camera. Historians have
proven that these women were often forced to remove their clothes and expose their breast, instilling the image of the
“savage” tribes in “Africa” in the European minds.
Morris, who has hired an African employee named Jonker, has him punish the Herero drastically. With this “division of
labor”, Timm alludes to the later exploitation of the Jewish Council in the deportation of Jews to the death camps, and to the
perfidious system of Kapos and oversight by other inmates in the concentration camps.
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capitalism, and the outright cheating of the tribes not only by the government but also by independent
entrepreneurs who regard the African colonies as a space of lawlessness all contribute to the so-called
“rebellion” in the colony.
With this detour that has prepared the reader for the symbolic meaning of the ostrich feather, the
narrator finally tells the tale of modern capitalism as the exploitation of land, animals, and humans
alike. A chief of the Bondelswarts, the same tribe that Gorth encountered in the mission of Bethany,
had engaged in the trade with ostrich feathers for a while, and now trades them with Klügge who
has finally departed company with Morris. After a while, however, all ostriches are killed and the
tribes are left in poverty and dependency, a predictable effect of a non-sustainable economy. As
the ostrich story is emblematic of the exploitation of resources and the deceit of the tribes, it is also
emblematic of the narrative strategy, namely, to construct a narrative order by connecting stories that
the reader only understands in hindsight. Under the surface of the title and Gottschalk’s experiences
in the colony, “Morenga” emerges as the colonial destruction of the cultural, religious, and economic
order long before the war completes this process with the literal destruction of the Herero and Nama
people. Intertwined with the Christian mission work and the politics of the German empire, German
colonialization functions as an economic order aimed at creating a transnational export–import market
that is meant to resemble the British system: Germany exports industrial goods to its colonies, builds a
new transportation system, and creates a “haven” for emigrants from Germany who purchase land
in the “protection zone” of the German empire. Instead of creating a market for the African tribes
themselves, the import of “colonial” goods to the European market is managed exclusively by the
white settlers, rendering their African counterpart in complete dependence to their colonizers.
3.3. Colonial Life III: Technological and Cultural Development
Morenga depicts two different approaches to the relationship between people and peoples, clearly
favoring one of them over the other: the European understanding is based on the development theory
that presupposes the superiority of the white race—development means to “lift up” the uncivilized
“savages”. It is therefore as unnecessary as it is futile to engage in the effort of understanding the
African cultures and traditions.
In the 19th century, capitalism is complemented by a plethora of technological developments,
and many German engineers engage in furthering the “development” of the continent.39 These
inventions play an important role in the narrative about the “development aid” the colonizers bring to
the African continent. In 1885, the German Colonial Company for South West Africa is established,
with the task of “the country of poets and thinkers to civilize the savages” (Timm 2003, p. 213f),
but in fact as an enterprise to extract the natural resources from the resource-rich colony, especially
copper and diamantes. One employee of the land company, Treptow, embodying the stereotypical
German engineering ingenuity, is sent to GSWA as a land surveyor. He is an idealist who believes
in progress through technological development: he is convinced that any “imperfection” of nature
will be “eliminated sooner or later by technical means.” (Timm 2003, p. 219). Having thought about
the “development of the earth”, he looks forward to contributing to the bright future of the land he
will survey:
Deserts would be irrigated, rivers that flooded vast stretches of land would be controlled,
dammed, or rechanneled. Anything could be accomplished with technology in a way that
would serve mankind.

39

Timm inserts several of such ideas to ridicule the colonial “business ideas” of the German technological and manufacturing
genius, and the overall idea of inserting ideas into cultures one doesn’t know, beginning with the language, geography,
climate, or culture. The dentures that Gottschalk constructs for the Nama cows underline the blurring of humans and animals
and contrast strikingly with General Trotha’s military orders given around the same time, namely to kill all “Hottentots”.
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Still in Germany, Treptow dreams of an irrigation system for the Sahara desert that will change the
climate of the whole region,40 or emptying the Caspian Sea, and rerouting the Volga river—the reader
is reminded of multiple so-called development projects that were pursued over the 19th century, such
as the Suez Canal, that only served the Colonial interests. Treptow also imagines the construction of a
“tropical car”—“a locomotive on moveable wheels with an engine fueled by coal or wood” (Timm
2003, p. 220). His partner in the mission Bethany, where he arrives some decades after Klügge, is
a geologist named Hartmann who discovers the veins of ore that the Colonial Company is seeking
to turn into business. Surveying the land, Treptow soon discovers that in the land-purchases to the
English colonists the tribes had been tricked, which by now could only be changed by the Company,
owned not only by Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank but behind these by their multiple shareholders.
The narrator lets Treptow tell an interesting story about the clash of European and African knowledge
systems: the council of elders—which is repeatedly presented in discussions about the course of
action in relation with the colonists—does not reach a consensus about a contract. An elderly, “Old
Salomon Matroos”, asks a wise old woman, Snuffle-Lip (who has refused to be baptized) to come
to help. Snuffle-Lip sometimes “would dispose of particularly stubborn and troublesome rivals by
making a doll, casting a spell, and then placing it on a termite mound.” (Timm 2003, p. 228). She
prepares a voodoo doll that embodies the “Company” and waits for it to be eaten by the termites.
Unfortunately, it does not happen, the termites do not touch it, and Snuffle-Lip is so undone by this
that she dies immediately after her failure. Treptow, however, does not believe in any magic power
and seeks an explanation for the magic of the voodoo. There is nothing he can find in the doll but
keeps it anyway as a souvenir, even taking it with him when he leaves the country. And then, one day,
the narrator concludes this side-story, transmitting to the reader the “folk tale” that Treptow tells his
grandchildren many years later as a story from the colonies, the doll disappears from the sideboard
where he has kept it—“devoured by ordinary domestic ants, which had quickly swarmed through the
house and just as quickly disappeared. A few days later, in 1918, the Land Company was dissolved.”
(Timm 2003, p. 229).
Treptow’s story demonstrates the narrator’s contempt, hidden in the double-speak of irony as a
narrative weapon against ideology. Treptow, the narrator comments, is concerned that the mentality he
encounters in the colony is so “communist” that it has become a second nature to the people, hindering
them in their “development”. The land-grabbing practices, Treptow reasons, may ultimately serve
them well, because it will “set in motion an evolution that will teach them to work and gradually
lead them toward civilization.” (Timm 2003, p. 230). He witnesses firsthand the tricks with which
land is grabbed from the Nama and corresponds with his former professor who is developing a new
method to survey the land. He invents the Molotov-Cocktail and then invents the car for the second
time, although he is deprived of the patents when his inventions are either dismissed or stolen by
others. Like Gottschalk, Treptow is a non-political figure who contributes to the colonization of GSWA
through his professional expertise and naivety. He is not interested in the culture and societal structure
of the Nama; he considers them as child-like, communists, habitually lazy, and in need of the German’s
development aid. He shares the sexualized and dehumanizing gaze at the Nama women but is too
afraid to follow his sexual desires: intercourse with them is an animal-like endeavor, he tells his
assistant Bansemer who raves about his nightly adventures. At one point, Treptow accompanies the
Company’s land agent Kleinschmidt who has come to quite some wealth in Windhoek through a land
purchase (or landgrab) from one of the Nama chiefs. Kleinschmidt is a realist, expecting a revolt sooner
or later. “War is the father of all things”, he claims, and quoting Missionary Knudsen (whom the reader
knows from an earlier story of the Missionaries): “take the land away from the natives. That’s the only
way they will ever be useful members of society. Only hunger will force them to work.” (Timm 2003,
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Later on, the reader learns that Gottschalk spends most of his last months in the colony observing changes of the climate, as
a digression from the reality that is happening around him. It repeats one of the stereotypes associated with the German
culture that contrasts strikingly with the very “efficient” activities of Germany’s military in the cleansing of the colony.
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p. 243). Kleinschmidt regards (the historical) Governor Leutwein’s effort to acquire land peacefully as
naïve yet has developed his own efficient method to get treaties signed. Treptow witnesses this on one
of the trips, when Kleinschmidt cheats a chief named Klaas Hendriks into selling his land.
Treptow resembles Gottschalk in his professional interest, and like the veterinarian, he is convinced
that he cannot intervene even when he has proof that the “natives” have been misled, cheated, or
exploited. He is complicit with the colonial politics under Governor Leutwein, doing nothing to stop
the escalating tensions that end with the shift of politics in the fall of 1904, when General von Trotha
orders the German military to kill any Herero and Nama. Gottschalk differs from Treptow, however, in
several ways: while he resembles Treptow in his ingenuity—after all, he engages in the most ridiculous
developmental aid at the moment when the Nama tribe is exterminated, i.e., constructing dentures
for the Nama cows—but like is colleague Wenstrup, he learns the Nama language and acts in small
gestures of charity towards the Nama who are held in concentration camps.
The colonial voices dominate in the novel’s multiple documents and stories that unfold in the
intersection of religion, economics, science, anthropology, politics, and military power. Through
Wenstrup, however, Gottschalk—and with him, the reader—learns about an alternative to the racist
colonial theory of development. Wenstrup, who brings Kropotkin’s book to the colony, gives it to
Gottschalk before his desertion. It offers a vision of development that is based on “mutual aid”, as the
title says. Together with Gottschalk’s friend’s marginal notes, Kropotkin’s book guides Gottschalk
in the judgment of the German war, especially after Wenstrup’s disappearance; it thus becomes the
lens through which Gottschalk begins to see his environment. Kropotkin argues for cooperation and
solidarity that will lift up everybody, and he rejects the central hypothesis of evolution theory, i.e., the
survival of the fittest as the motor of development. Timm traces the two ideological systems to their
origins in the 19th century, but for his own generation in the 1970s, politics and personal lives often
intersect: the division line between the two worldviews runs through Germany, the divided country
during the Cold War, and Timm uses the novel among other things to reflect upon the consequences of
colonial capitalism over and against the anarchist socialist vision; Wenstrup is the only moral German
hero: he learns the Nama language, sabotages some of the military attacks, and finally deserts from the
troops in the midst of their massacres. Gottschalk, in contrast, is painted as the stereotypical obedient
German soldier: doubtful and increasingly disgusted by the German soldiers’ brutality, he is not able
to move from contemplation of resistance to action. Early on, he begins to have doubts about the
developmental enterprise lest it is based on the understanding of the other:
How can we expect to colonize a land if we don’t take the trouble to understand the natives,
Gottschalk once asked in Keetmanshoop. (Timm 2003, p. 82)
Politically, however, Gottschalk remains a bystander, stuck in ineffective subversive gestures.
While Gottschalk cannot agree with the racist social Darwinism, he also does not have Wenstrup’s
courage to switch sides. He remains the “dreamer” (Timm 2003, p. 12) who in the beginning takes
delight in the thought “that at some point there will be eyes in this wilderness reading Goethe, ears
listening to Mozart” (Timm 2003, p. 16), and in the end is consumed by observing the “clouds”. The
English language speaks of the “bystander” as the person who is neither perpetrator nor victim. The
German language calls this the Mitläufer, someone who “goes along” with events enacted by others,
whether agreeing with them or not. The relationship between colonizer and colonized is a constant
topic of Gottschalk’s diary, but he is “stuck” in between the two sides. Sometimes he dares to apply the
arguments he has learned from his Kropotkin reading and Wenstrup’s marginal notes. One example is
a conversation between Gottschalk and his colleague, medical lieutenant Dr. Haring. Haring argues:
The weak die off so the strong will have more room and light. That was the only way things
could evolve onward and upward. The struggle for existence was the basic law of life. (Timm
2003, p. 197)
Gottschalk, in contrast, evokes Kropotkin’s view: “The struggle for existence was not the only
important factor, mutual aid within the species was equally important.” (ibid.). When Haring responds:
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“exactly, [ . . . ] within the species”, implying that there are different human species (in line with
Haeckel’s racist polygenesis thesis that departs from Darwin’s monogenesis thesis), Gottschalk counters
that even cross-species “empathy” and “solidarity” is possible. He recounts a story of a sailor who
would have drowned but for the help of dolphins who carry him in turns and thereby save him.
Against Hobbes’ theory of natural rights, but also against Kant’s ethics of the “good will” or
Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness, Kropotkin repeats the Marxian materialist thesis to the effect
that the environment determines the behavior of animals and humans alike; Wenstrup draws the
following conclusion from it, noted in one of the marginal notes of the book: “German philistines are
wrong in thinking that morality is based on good intentions; it is based instead on living conditions.”
(Timm 2003, p. 196). While the European worldview is centered on freedom from nature, wealth, and
well-being, Kropotkin’s worldview is centered on freedom as absence of oppression and exploitation.
Gottschalk reads Kropotkin who in turn is quoting Bakunin:
Man is truly free only among free men, and since he is only characteristically human when
he is free, the subjugation of a single human being on earth is an injury to the principle of
humanity itself, and a negation of the freedom of all men. Bakunin (Timm 2003, p. 123)
Whereas the German idea of civilization is shaped by discipline and uniformity, as seen in the
military order and the assumption of the linear upward development of humans, the history of the
Nama since the German colonization is narrated as the story of oppression. The Herero and Nama
revolt against the German idea of freedom that they experience as force and coercion; they fight for
their own understanding of freedom, because, as Wenstrup tells Gottschalk, “a man who can’t freely
develop a sense of things makes no sense. That’s why the rebels seem to have so much sense on their
side.” (Timm 2003, p. 47).
Gottschalk observes that Kropotkin often draws analogies between the world of animals and the
world of human beings, which may especially appeal to the veterinarians Wenstrup and himself.41
Throughout the novel, the relationship between humans and animals is constantly renegotiated.
Human and animal metaphors, for instance, are used interchangeably, blurring the lines of the species
and thereby questioning the “humanist” anthropology and ethics. When helping the wounded soldiers
after a battle, Gottschalk remembers a quote from Kropotkin: even rats are sufficiently intelligent,
Kropotkin states, “not to quarrel when they plunder our larders, but to aid one another in their
plundering expeditions and migrations, and even to feed their invalids.” (Timm 2003, p. 202). Claiming
moral behavior as exclusive to the rational human being is unmasked as an ideology of racist superiority
that reverses the criteria for moral behavior: if “good” is determined by the power of the “strong”,
empathy disappears together with the notion of “mutual aid”, which is one possible translation of
solidarity. Ultimately, only Wenstrup draws the conclusions from his readings in his desertion from
the army while Gottschalk flees to the contemplation of “bushes, rock formations” the “landscape”, or
Kant’s “starry heaven” that fills him with awe and sentimental memories, but which is also a sign that
he is searching for a sense of direction at a moment of utter disorientation.
The oppression of the colonized people and peoples is symbolized by the “oxen” who are as
enslaved as the tribes to whom they belong. Whoever hears their voices understands the meaning of
the Nama language. In contrast to Gottschalk, the narrator seems to move swiftly between the two
cultures, trans-lating (in Latin: carrying over) and trans-mitting (in Latin: sending over) elements
of both to the reader. Though almost hidden in the many strata, the history of the Nama people
is sedimented underneath the colonial history, retrieved by the work of the narrative archaeologist
who translates the Nama genealogy from the “language of the oxen” into meaningful language when
Gottschalk or others understand nothing. The novel entails two longer tales that are told by a lead ox
named “Big Red”. He not only tells the story of how the first “Hottentot” named “Hurt Knee” tricked
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a cow into the “yoke” (Timm 2003, p. 105ff) but also how the rivalry between the Nama and Herero
emerged due to their competition for land. From the perspective of the cattle the decisive shift comes,
however, with the English businessmen who begin to steal cattle from the Herero. Here, the narrative
of the ox and the story of Morris and Klügge intersect. Contrary to Gottschalk, the narrator also
understands what the “mooing cow” says while Gottschalk operates on her using a surgical method
unknown to the Herero:
[Gottschalk] understood nothing. Otherwise he could have heard all about Big-Red, who
pulled Missionary Gorth’s wagon into this land, or of Christopherus, who had brought
Klügge’s mighty brandy barrel to thirsty Bethany, or of the most famous pathfinder of all
draft oxen, Fork-Horn, who pulled the surveyor Treptow safely and surely through the plains
and deserts. Of these prodigious feats Gottschalk knew nothing. (Timm 2003, p. 127)
When Dr. Haring asks Gottschalk after the successful operation why he even bothered about one
cow, he gives him an explanation that does not require much sophistication but human decency. Any
medical professional ought to understand this—yet the reader also knows how decisive physicians
were for the euthanasia program of the Nazis, and therefore may well associate Dr. Haring with his
Nazi successors. Gottschalk, in contrast, knows what to do in his own profession: “The cow would
have died” (ibid.). Obviously, his morality is not understood in the unfolding genocide.
3.4. Colonial Life IV: Biological Racism and Violence
Two thirds into the novel, the reader finds a Report to the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences
regarding the relationship of the “Hottentots to other races” (269)42 by a (fictitious) Dr. Leonhardt
Brunkhorst who has undertaken an expedition to “Namaland and Kalahari” between 1903 and 1905.
In this report, which may be read both as an intertextual commentary to Kafka’s Report to an Academy
and one more intratextual commentary from yet another perspective, Brunkhorst presents the German
theory of races—the voice of the Academy that we can now add to Kafka’s Report, because here it is
explicit what Red Peter alluded to as the position of the Academy, represented, too, in Eugen Fischer’s
dissertation on the Rehobot (Fischer 1913).
First, “Hottentots” are seen in relation to the Boers who are depicted with denigrating, hateful
comments. The Boers, Brunkhorst states, held the Nama as slaves for centuries, and their cruelty and
religious bigotry, including their supersessionism, is juxtaposed with the German missionaries who, in
contrast to the Boers, granted the Nama certain rights. In the 1850s, missionaries like Gorth shared the
hard life of the Nama and sometimes even “went so far as to marry a native, to achieve a deeper and
more intimate empathy with them.” (Timm 2003, p. 271). Thanks to the protection treaties with the
German Empire, “strongly promoted by the Missionary Society”, the Nama are by now sedentary and
the mission is flourishing. In fact, it functions as a link between the two “heterogeneous races” as long
as it finds an equilibrium between the interests of the native and the “invading race”. Between the two
extremes of befriending the natives and eradicating them, Brunkhorst argues, the colonists’ interests
must be linked with the natives’ own interests (ibid.). Realistically, this “race” is not made for work;
the “Hottentots” are lazy and hedonistic, “sitting around, drinking schnapps, dancing or dreaming
away beneath blue clouds of pipe smoke.” (Timm 2003, p. 273).43 They select from Christianity what
resembles their own “heathen past”, although their “social norms” that discourage competition clearly
hinder economic development:
“brotherly love among the Hottentots in the form of mutual aid, respect for the elderly
and for women, their tender affection for children, their abstemiousness with regard to the
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The German is more drastic, emphasizing the objectifying tone: “Das Verhältnis der Hottentotten zu anderen
Menschenrassen”.
In a conversation with Treptow, geologist Hartmann argues that smoking the pipe is a sophisticated cultural technique that
requires a fine taste, and seen in that respect, the “Hottentots have a highly developed culture”.
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property of others (although limited to the property of their own tribe)—all these are such
autochthonous laws.” (Timm 2003, p. 272)
Clearly, Brunkhorst wants them to adopt the Lutheran Protestantism that Weber had described as
driving force of capitalism, so that the “systematic training of the natives for work” (in other words:
forcing them into labor) ought to be “a religious demand of the Christian mission as well” (Timm 2003,
p. 273). Brunkhorst then recommends some competition between the Catholic and Protestant mission
to be stirred, in order to find out which of the two produces the more willing workers and supporters
of the government.
The “relation” of the Nama to the German “master” is mostly described in terms of punishment
and disciplining, with Brunkhorst complaining about the inconsistency of the German soldiers who
are “wielding a blow and then immediately apologizing for it.” Any transgression (or the assumed
transgression) of a norm must be punished. While everyone is responsible for the relationships,
Brunkhorst complains about the immaturity of the Germans in this respect: instead of wavering
between fraternization and mastery posture, “sympathy for foreign qualities joined with a calm, firm
preservation of our own superiority, does not appeal to us.” (Timm 2003, p. 275). This is misrecognition
masked as recognition as described by Fanon. The reader, however, has at this point already read the
(historical) instructions on “flogging” which Timm quotes, involving a discussion of which material
should be used for what “crimes” and to what effect (Timm 2003, pp. 115–19). The academic language
Brunkhorst uses conceals the brutality of the content of his suggestions. At the end of his report,
Brunkhorst points to the “Hottentot’s” ability to imitate their masters, to the point of caricaturing
them, and warns the Academy not to underestimate their capabilities in matters “that touch the core of
their being”.44
3.5. Colonial Life V: Politics and War
The encounters of human beings, and moreover between strangers, are initiated by ritualized
forms of greeting and welcoming, which function as a structure of one’s recognition of the presence of
the other: under military and colonial rule, greeting rituals express the power structure—hierarchal
order and the relation of domination and submission. But rituals of greetings may also express the
norms of hospitality, and as such, they are codified as social and ethical norms in the Jewish tradition.45
Greeting, this means, is never ethically neutral. It plays a prominent role in Morenga, too. Almost at
the same time as Kafka’s Red Peter is brought from the African Gold Coast to Hamburg in a cage,
Veterinarian lieutenant Gottschalk travels from Hamburg to the African colony in a navy ship. While
Red Peter is caged and tortured, Gottschalk is part of the “other side”, in this case the military hierarchy
that entails strict rules of encounters among the German ranks, the “Regulations for Saluting”:
On ships a superior officer is saluted once a day, the first time he is encountered. A Veterinary
N.C.O. salutes a Veterinary Lieutenant by touching the brim of his cap or hat. The Lieutenant
gives an identical salute to a Medical Lieutenant. All three ranks, N.C.O., Veterinary
Lieutenant, and Medical Lieutenant, must salute first, as indicated above when meeting a
Second Lieutenant. (Timm 2003, p. 7)
This ritual of salutation actualizes the hierarchical order of the military regime on a regular basis,
expressing the morality of “order” and discipline that must be followed meticulously while the moral
transgressions, i.e., the humiliation, flogging, starving, and killing of thousands of Nama and Herero
people, are never questioned but instead justified as necessary means to an end. The strict military
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hierarchy mirrors the categorization of the human “races” that underlies the legitimatization of the
genocide. In the fall of 1907, a few months before his return to Germany, Gottschalk notes in his diary:
The other, the new: the Jumping Bean Tree. Its exact opposite: clicking your heels. Clack.
Standing at attention. The German eagle. The abstract. Asking no questions. Saying yes, sir.
The love of law and order. Isn’t it telling that we Germans always say: Geht in Ordnung
when we mean that’s fine. (Timm 2003, p. 288)
The other, the new, Gottschalk notes a little later, “would be a new perception of time, based on
the logic of the senses. Not on the logic of ends and means. The properly hedge of meaning.” (Timm
2003, p. 289). The jumping bean tree, an old Nama has told him a few months earlier, is the tree where
the wishes of the African people grow.
On 2 October 1904, General Trotha orders the killing of every “Hottentot”. In November, his
military successor, Colonel Deimling, is fighting against the Herero in the North, while the Nama leader
Morenga lays siege in the South, the town of Warmbad, which will be the station where Gottschalk
will spend most of his time. The military leaders consider Morenga at least as great a threat as the
Herero leader Hendrik Witbooi (Timm 2003, p. 27). Morenga is admiringly called a “general” by
German military, and the more Gottschalk doubts the justification for the colonial war, the more visible
Morenga becomes in the narrative. Empirical history and narrative history “cross-reference,” and both
are needed to understand the colonial war.
Not only is Morenga the topic of several consultations between General Deimling and Trotha
who disagree about the strategy how to defeat him, an interview to the newspaper Cape Time quotes
Morenga mocking the German army for not being prepared to fight a “guerilla war” (29).46 In contrast
to the Herero leader Witbooi who copies the German killing of prisoners: “The Germans take no
prisoners. We will take no prisoners” (Timm 2003, p. 71), Morenga is said to treat prisoners humanely.
The siege of Warmbad at the end of 1904 is told in detail, however entirely from the perspective of the
German military that ultimately holds the town, “warding off a potentially serious blow to German
prestige in Africa” (Timm 2003, p. 79). When Morenga reappears after almost a hundred pages, the
reader has become familiarized with the facets of the colonial life, with the Nama history, and the
cruelty with which the German soldiers treat the Nama and Herero in the concentration camps.
Like the Warmbad siege, the novel depicts the battle in the South of the Colony in great detail,
mirroring the well-known war stories from soldiers after World War II that Timm remembers from
his own childhood.47 In contrast to the siege of Warmbad, however, the narrative shifts increasingly
between the perspectives of Morenga’s and the German troops, and it repeatedly refers to the admiration
German officers felt for Morenga’s strategic warfare, recounted in their reports. The narrator describes
a photograph that shows Morenga with three other guerillas, pointing to the similarity between him
and Che Guevara (a legendary revolutionary, admired in the students’ movement of the early 1970s).
Some entries from a fragmentary diary that Morenga is said to have written are inserted, though the
narrator laments that most of it is lost, just as numerous other documents from the genocide. With
this, the novel emphasizes the need for a “diatopical” method of historiography (de Sousas Santos
2014) that is impeded because the narrator has difficulties in obtaining documents after the murder
of those who would have been interested in preserving them. Yet, with the fragments it has, the
narrative begins the process of correcting the German military history that rests upon the “orderly”
preserved empirical documents, complementing these with the fragmentary documents that represent
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the Nama’s own voices. Through its story-telling, literature—fictitious and documentary—thereby
contributes to the process of correcting the injustice to the Nama; yet, Timm is careful to tell their
stories indirectly, subversively, and without claiming that a German novel can speak in the voices of
the Nama or on behalf of them. Rather, Morenga corrects Germany’s own colonial narrative, engages in
the historical work of analyzing Germany’s colonial genocide in the medium of literature that plays
with the cross-reference of history and fiction, and addresses the (German) reader to take responsibility
for their history beginning with historical knowledge.
3.6. Gottschalk and Morenga
Warmbad becomes the town in which Gottschalk spends most of his time during his stay in
GSWA, arriving there in January 1905 just after the siege and leaving the country about the same
time of Morenga’s death in the fall of 1907. This time span is told as a thorough transformation,
resulting from the damage of Gottschalk’s “moral equilibrium” through his new moral perception of
the whites and the blacks in the colony. Upon his arrival, however, he still dreams about building a
new existence here: “[i]ndependent and free, a calm, comfortable life” (Timm 2003, p. 121). He muses
about building a house, a garden, a school, water pumps driven by windmills, and introducing “the
nightingale to this songless country” (ibid.). Gottschalk stumbles into the war with little knowledge of
the African culture, a deeply unpolitical man of 34 years who is caught in a conflict that he believes
he will survive unchanged. But less than six months into his stay he senses the changes of his moral
compass, especially the normalization of the “genocidal gaze” that he is adopting. He is shocked
about “his own failure to be shocked” about the shooting of a rebel. Looking at himself one day,
he sees a “stranger” staring at him “from the splinter of mirror” (Timm 2003, p. 125): “They shot a
man, and all I thought was, I hope no one hears it.” Repeatedly he thinks “one must do something”,
noticing how he thinks of himself in the third person, referring to himself as “one” and “he” (Timm
2003, p. 126), just like Kafka had depicted the “human” he encountered as the “civilized” Europeans.
Gottschalk slowly transforms into the disillusioned soldier who is caught between the two sides of the
war, the two cultures he encounters, and between the two moralities; the “civilized superiority” of
the Germans turns out to be of bestial brutality that goes far beyond the violence Gottschalk knows
from his studies of animals—and is therefore a moral inferiority—while the Nama and Herero value
their communal solidarity, the freedom they express happily in celebrations, dances, and songs, and a
sense of justice that compares their poverty and oppression to the wealth and power of the colonizers.
Gottschalk, his colleagues think, is slowly losing his (European) mind, more often than not seen
among the “Hottentots”, and ultimately beginning to “smell like them”, at least in the eyes of his
fellow soldiers.
Gottschalk knows that he is not able to bridge the distance to the Nama people whom he encounters
with the generous, paternalistic respect of the colonizer, depicted above as conditional recognition
as one way of misrecognition. Though he tries to imitate Wenstrup in his efforts to learn the Nama
language and learn about their culture, Gottschalk realizes that the German colonial and military
logic of discipline, order, and instrumental rationality (that includes the legitimacy of genocide) is
incompatible with the Nama logic that is based on subsistence rather than accumulation of goods,
cultural rituals rooted in aesthetic, communal expression (dance, music, celebrations), decision-making
upon consultation, and the social adaption to the colonial religion, colonial language, economics, and
governance that has left many of the their families in dire poverty. Men are depicted as addicted to
alcohol, women as prostitutes, and young men as the servants of the settlers. Gottschalk observes
these structures, but he does not gain an objective view “from above” but is positioned at the margins
of events. His struggle with the translation between the two languages is emblematic for his failure
to remain the same, yet unable to become another: he often fails in translating the Nama terms into
his own language, or vice versa, explain the meaning of German words into the Nama language. He
learns to pronounce the Nama words but he often misunderstands their meaning. His dream of a
bourgeois German life with a house, wife, children who together listen to and play classical European
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music (Timm 2003, p. 14) in the midst of the African continent crushes when he sees his future in
the face of his Nama friend’s mother. While Katharina has become his companion, her attempt to
introduce him into her family ends their relationship: Gottschalk sees her father, drunk in the morning,
babbling in Cape Dutch, and constantly repeating the only German word he knows, namely “it’s okay”
or “Gehtinordnung” (Timm 2003, p. 251), and he suddenly sees the future Katharina in her mother,
depicted in the stereotypical image of the colonial “savage”, well known from photographs sent to
Germany from the colonies:
A fat woman appeared, her breasts hanging out of her tattered dress as if these large lumps
of flesh did not belong to her. Her backside was the size of a barrel. Everything small and
delicate in Katharina was colossally enlarged in this woman. The frightening thing was that
Gottschalk saw the mother in the daughter. (Timm 2003, p. 252)
Despite the feeling of physical intimacy, he will remember months later, he knows that their
distance is “unbridgeable” (ibid.).
In mid-March 1905, Gottschalk and Morenga cross ways for the first time, albeit only indirectly, in
a battle Gottschalk is partaking in. His sympathies clearly are with Morenga, although Gottschalk is
disappointed when the Nama show little resistance to the German troops. In Warmbad, Gottschalk had
confessed to Doctor Haring that he would not actively fight or shoot a “Hottentot” (Timm 2003, p. 253).
Now, engaged (or entrapped) in the battle, he thinks about the possibility of some act of resistance:
“something to break through this indifference, the internal frost in the midst of the singeing heat”,
shooting the colonel, taking off, joining the fleeing Nama—but in the end, he only runs “aimlessly
about in the terrain” (Timm 2003, p. 203). The Nama are defeated, and Morenga only escapes with
a gunshot injury. A few days later, Gottschalk obtains Morenga’s white horse that had been caught
running “back and forth between the front lines”, just as Gottschalk had, both connected in their
disorientation: the white veterinarian soldier running about the German and the Nama troops, and the
white horse running about the Nama and the German front lines.
A parliamentary report recounts a meeting of a German officer with Morenga in April 1905,
on Morenga’s terrain. It mentions the colonial greeting ritual as a demonstration of power:
I seated myself and remained intentionally seated as Morenga [ . . . ] approached. It was not
until he greeted me and I saw it was clearly difficult for him to stand that I permitted him
to seat. (Timm 2003, p. 189)
The officer also reports that in his view Morenga’s leadership is declining, projecting how this
would happen in the German army to Morenga’s people:
Such power, which only hereditary chiefs have otherwise, is shaken the moment his followers
begin to lose their unconditional faith in their leader’s lucky start and the certainty of victory
is undermined. (ibid.).48
Gottschalk, for his part, notes in a remark on “the gestures of masters and the facial expressions
of power”:
“Finer, sublimated forms one no longer notices back home, because one is used to them: [ . . .
] Instead of looking subordinates in the eye, one glances at the cap rim, up and slightly past
it.” (Timm 2003, p. 193)
Finally, when Gottschalk meets Morenga in September in 1905 (and a hundred pages later), the
novel has taken so many detours that Morenga’s behavior no longer comes as a surprise. The reader

48

For the German readers, these sentences are tainted in their reminiscence of the Führer Hitler and his “unconditional
followers”.

Humanities 2019, 8, 120

26 of 31

is given a report that Gottschalk must write to his superiors, because they are suspicious that he
was released by Morenga’s troops unscathed after they captured him in the midst of the battle in
Heirachabis. Ironically, Gottschalk describes his mental state at the time of his capture as “slightly
dazed”, which he relates to a fall when his camel is shot. The report itself is a masterpiece of ironic
story-telling, resembling the subversive strategy that Kafka uses in his story. Unlike Kafka’s story,
however, it entails some comments as “marginal notes”, added by the Colonial Guardian Headquarter
to whom the report is addressed, complementing Gottschalk’s voice with the military commentary,
again reflecting the archaeological “assembly” of the sediments of history as different narrative voices.
Gottschalk reports that the rebels engaged in a long conversation with him about his rank: “I tried
to explain that I wasn’t an officer in the true sense, but simply a veterinarian, an animal doctor.”
(Timm 2003, p. 300). In spite of being an animal doctor, he treats Morenga’s gunshot wound, which he
describes in detail. In view of the commentator, Gottschalk acts strangely and out of bound:
“I asked his conditions for peace. (Marginal note: Is he crazy?) He said his demands were
quite simple: to let them live freely in their own country. [ . . . ] But Morenga also emphasized
that he would keep fighting to the last man. And when I asked why, he offered the surprising
answer: So that you and we can remain human. (Marginal note: native logic!)” (301)
Contrasting his observation with the officer’s report, Gottschalk finds the Nama rebels in good
morale and Morenga’s leadership uncontested: “The recognition Morenga received as their leader
seemed equally voluntary.” (ibid.). In the evening before he is released, Gottschalk is finally immersed
into the Nama culture, joining the singing and dancing (as a Prisoner of War!). Yet, even after this
encounter with Morenga and his people that clearly leaves Gottschalk deeply impressed, he realizes:
These people were near to him and yet infinitely distant. Had he remained, he would have
had to learn to think and feel differently. Radically change his thinking. Think with his senses.
(Timm 2003, p. 321)
In the investigation against Gottschalk, another wounded soldier is questioned who reveals that
this conversation between Gottschalk and Morenga was held in Nama, and apart from this, he had
noticed only one more remarkable thing: “when taken to Morenga, the veterinarian held out his hand,
which the other man simply ignored, which Lämmer found unbelievably impertinent” (Timm 2003,
p. 302). When they left, however, “Morenga held out his hand to Gottschalk” (ibid.). Tragically, some
of Gottschalk’s statements about Morenga’s intentions lead to some changes in the German military
strategy (or so he thinks); in violation of colonial rules, they attack the Nama in British territory to
where they have withdrawn in the spring of 1906; Morenga is severely wounded again, and he turns
himself in to the English a little later, asking for asylum, reflecting Morenga’s knowledge of his rights.
The military battles of the year 1906 until the official ending of the war in March 1907 are only
summarized: after Morenga’s defeat, mirrored by the Herero’s defeat, it is clear that the rebels have no
chance against the soldiers Germany has by then deployed to the colony. The laws become ever-more
gruesome: all land and livestock is confiscated, the “natives” are forced into labor leaving them without
any cultural or political organization; they have to wear a pass token around their neck; they either
work as forced laborers or are held in concentration camps. Many of them die on Shark Island—in
a breach of the treaty but following through the military order given by General Trotha: “a good
Hottentot is a dead Hottentot”—resulting in the eradication of their culture. The narrative ends with
the confirmation of the beginning: Morenga’s life is surrounded by multiple legends, elevating him to
mythical status. In the fall of 1907, he is killed in a united attack by German and British forces. The
“end” of the war is summarized in the (fictitious) military report, reaffirming the colonial order:
The natives of South Africa will now realize they’re not fighting the Germans, or the English, or
the Dutch, but that now the entire white race stands united against the black. (Timm 2003, p. 337)
Throughout 1906 to the fall of 1907, the time of Morenga’s death and Gottschalk’s return to
Germany, Gottschalk stays in Ukamas as one of three veterinarians. Having little to do, Gottschalk
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becomes apathetic, spends his time mostly alone observing the clouds and the weather, absorbed
by daydreams of a future that he knows will not come true; he is tormented by his bad conscience
because of his complicity and complacency but remains unable to act, even hesitant in petitioning
to be discharged, “as if he were waiting for something” that he cannot name. Others see him as a
“sleepwalker” (Timm 2003, p. 314) and “eccentric” (Timm 2003, p. 316); they see how “he sat silently
staring into the distance, surrounded by a cool reserve. It was the loneliness of total apathy” (ibid.).
Finally, he submits his petition in May of 1907, but only after learning about what the Germans call
Morenga’s “surrender” to the British. Asked for his reason for the petition, he says “he no longer
wished to take part in the slaughter of innocent people” (Timm 2003, p. 323), which his superior
repeatedly narrates to others as the unheard-of anecdote of the guy who had begun to resemble the
“Hottentots” in his appearance and even his smell.
3.7. Narrative Ethics and the Responsibility for the Past
In the “time in between” the battles and his discharge Gottschalk begins to reflect upon his
transformation, seeking answers in metaphors and analogies of nature and humans. He compares the
geology of the land to the inner self “with its fissures, displacements, sediments, deposits, and erosions”
(Timm 2003, p. 318). As for the “Gottschalkian cloud morphology”, Gottschalk’s observations are
“a passionate attempt to restore to a fossilized and desensitized language an element of the spontaneity,
diversity, and individuality that Gottschalk seemed to recognize in the formation of the clouds” (ibid.).
Combining the sound—the Nama language is known for its “clicking sounds” that the Germans find
difficult to learn, the novel repeatedly states—with meaning that one can understand is part of learning
a language. Gottschalk, however, runs into multiple difficulties of translation, which becomes the
symbol of bridging the “unbridgeable” alienness (Waldenfels 2011), but increasingly also between him
and his fellow Germans. This is the reason why he turns to the “clouds” as well as to the sediments of
history preserved in the geology of a land. Both entail Timm’s poetics, captured in these metaphors.
While geology requires the work of a geologist, meteorology follows the movements of weather in
real time; hence, Gottschalk interprets the events while they occur, while the narrator reconstructs the
history like a geologist. Yet, like Gottschal, the narrator seeks to bridge the empirical documentation of
the movement of the clouds, i.e., the events over time, in a “constant series of new descriptions” with
“at least some degree of abstraction” that allows for “conceptual generalization”. The latter are needed
to enable an “intelligible transmittal” of observations. In this way, the Nama meaning of “cloud”,
namely “infinite” (Timm 2003, p. 50), receives a late recognition as another metaphor of historical
narratives: they, too, are indeed ever-changing and infinite, because the events cross-reference with the
forms of the narrative.
Gottschalk, it is said, reinvents the mechanism of the “free balloon” around this time, invoking
the metaphor for the narrator of history who is, at the same time, a participant in history: the “balloon
pilot, who would be completely at the mercy of the momentary direction of the wind if he were sailing
freely, is able to navigate the balloon to some degree by means of the resistance of ropes that drag
along the ground.” (Timm 2003, p. 318). The metaphor of meteorology is repeated in the epilogue,
with a slightly different turn, now revealing the poetics of the novel that anticipates Ricœur’s term
of the crossed reference of empirical and narrative knowledge in historical and fictional narratives:
observing the weather resembles the observation of historical events over time, abstracting to a certain
degree is as necessary in meteorology as in historical narratives (and fiction), and constructing some
conceptual generalization are the tools needed for the narrative of historical events, too. Furthermore,
balloon flights, the narrator now holds, are “a work of art in which the pilot, the balloon, the wind and
weather, and the landscape as well, unite” (Timm 2003, p. 338), which can also be read as an aesthetic
ideal. In this utopian world, symbolized by a balloon flight, there is no exploitation, “except for the
fuel”, no torment or mistreatment of people. The balloon flight is of no economic value, because it
can only be navigated in limited ways; it is, as Gottschalk’s friend says, “like working with precision
scales” (ibid.). But if the balloon flight is indeed a metaphor for the work of art in which the narrator
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unites with the story and the events that contribute to it, it is presented as a cautionary tale: art may
also be an escape, the illusion of freedom in forgetting. In the final scene, Gottschalk sees the world
from above; it seems to be as it has always been, as if history could be forgotten—he sees the German
landscape and culture, recognizing all the familiar sounds of life as if nothing had changed, and as if
he had never been to the foreign country in which the cruelest crimes imaginable were committed:
nothing, it seems, not even the genocide that he participated in and let him lose his moral compass,
has motivated him to act and/or remember differently.
Years later, Timm writes in his book about his brother (Timm 2005), that one of the most shocking
facts concerning the soldiers who refused to take part in the mass killings of World War II was that
they did not have to fear much punishment—mostly, those who deserted or refused the orders were
discharged or sent to another unit. The figure of Gottschalk can therefore also be read as the harbinger
of these later soldiers. He embodies the disinterested, forgetful, and joyful postwar German soldier
who continues to claim that he was no more than a bystander, while in fact he was a Mitläufer who did
not merely stand by but who “went along”with the mass atrocities. They certainly did not live up to
the concept of enlightenment that the Western world celebrated as the its biggest achievement. For
one of its most prominent representatives, Immanuel Kant, enlightenment did indeed mean freedom.
But he saw freedom as capability and responsibility, an autonomy that is the moral capacity to only
live by that moral law that one has, at the same time, given oneself and that could be shared by all
others as a universal moral law (Kant 2013). Coloniality does not only contradict human decency; it
also contradicts the very tradition that it claims to adhere to.
4. Towards a Decolonial Narrative Ethics
In addition to the critique of recognition theory that requires a break with the ethically flawed
concept of conditional recognition and a reinterpretation of recognition from an ethical point of view,
I want to draw some conclusions from the fictional narrative of history that Kafka’s short story and
Timm’s novel offer. I hope that the two examined texts in this essay can help to further develop a
decolonial ethics, and as part of it, a decolonial narrative ethics.
My reading of the two stories illuminated racist coloniality as a structure of misrecognition of
concrete others (animals, humans who are rendered animal-like, African cultures under colonial rule,
and Europeans who are socialized to repress their drives and sensitivities). It calls, in a first step, for a
hermeneutical virtue ethics that is informed by literature as a medium of and for ethics. Narrative
ethics shows that this must be concrete and situated—as any storyteller and story is. As long as the
“other” who speaks, who addresses the reader, and to whom the reader responds, is not concretized in
historical terms, a “responsoric” recognition or recognitive responsibility remains in the aesthetic realm,
without ramifications for the concrete personal, social, or political action—reading Timm’s novel does
not in itself change Germany’s relation to the Nama and Ovaherero, for example. Without a doubt,
unlearning of the colonial habitus, the social character that Fromm analyzed as the patterns of human
destructiveness (Fromm 1973), and learning recognition as inter-action and acting together is necessary
and a huge task. But it must not replace the other elements of responsibility, i.e., accountability on the
one hand, and the responsibility to transform structures of injustice into justice as political practice.49
Readers, among others, respond to narratives as moral agents who engage in an ethical deliberation
how to see—and change—the world they live in. Storytelling therefore serves practical reasoning both
as an aesthetic–hermeneutic responsoric ethics that aims at recognition, and as responsibility of a moral
agent who is, like every other agent, “aiming for a good life with and for others in just institutions”
(Ricœur 1992). Ethics must ask who is responsible for what practices and structures, and in what way,
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and who is most urgently in need of actions, and in what way.50 Decolonial ethics comes with an
interest that goes beyond its counterpart in literature: it does not only aim to understand the structures
of colonial thinking and acting, it also aims to correct and rectify past—and present—injustices, in order
to restore justice or establish justice for the first time. Ethical theory uses different terms to describe
this transformation of injustice into justice, but in any case, restitutive, reparative, or restorative justice
models are social–ethical and political–ethical efforts that attend to the different positions of agents
in regard to justice. In the case of Germany’s history that I have examined here from a narrative
ethics perspective, perpetrators of the colonial genocide—who are named in Timm’s novel just like
Hagenbeck is named in Kafka’s story—have never been held accountable, just like how only a few
perpetrators after the Shoah were put on trial. The present generation, even though not directly
accountable, is still responsible for Germany’s past, because it is still present, independent of the
outcome, for example, of a lawsuit over reparation claims.51 The present generation’s ethical duty is to
engage in the work of recognition that begins indeed with re-cognition, the looking back in order to
know one’s past, and acknowledge what happened in the former German colony. This engagement
must be guided by respect, attention, and care for the present and future well-being of the descendants
of the genocide. The descendants of the victims must not only be heard in their address, in testimonies
and their accounts of the suffering and humiliation of the past and, moreover, of the effects on their
life at present in Namibia. Their address must also be responded to, in the practical, imperfect and
finite, yet mutual work of recognition that ultimately may result in the transformation of both parties,
the goal of reconciliatory justice. Whether it is through reparations or other, necessarily imperfect,
ways of recognition aimed at rectifying what cannot be rectified (Derrida 2001), mutual recognition is
“accepting partial success” of reconciliation, instead of being paralyzed by the inability to reach the
state of perfection, just as any storyteller accepts the partiality of the story they tell, instead of falling
silent in the wake of the unspeakable cruelty that only human beings are capable to inflict upon others.
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